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Good, Bad and Wrongful Juvenile Sex:
Rethinking the Use of Statutory Rape Laws
Against the Protected Class
Dr. Anna High *
This article considers the question of whether statutory
rape laws can and should be used against members of the class
they were designed to protect. Many commentators have argued
that meaningfully consensual sex among similarly situated and
sufficiently mature teenagers should be beyond the scope of
strict liability rape laws, but the question becomes more fraught
in the context of the “contested outer limits” of adolescent
sexuality—sexual contact among children and adolescents that
offends social norms, leads to harmful outcomes or appears to
be exploitative. What are the implications of using statutory
rape laws against minors to target “bad sex”?
I contend that even in relation to “bad sex,” there are
serious policy and constitutional objections to the use of
statutory rape laws against a member of the class they are
designed to protect. In jurisdictions without all-encompassing
age-gap provisions, the response to sex among adolescents
needs to be reformulated to ensure that the use of statutory rape
laws against minors is confined to cases involving wrongful, as
opposed to mere bad, sex, and is predicated on a clear and
objective definition of exploitation, as opposed to mere
fornication, as the punitive target.

I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of when and how to use the law to regulate
youthful sexual encounters is both urgent and analytically
complex. Juveniles today are immersed in an online world that
grants unprecedented access to sexual imagery and discourse.
*
Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law,
BA, LLB, BCL, MPhil, DPhil (Oxon). I am grateful to Professors Joshua Dressler, Alex
Tsesis, Sacha M. Coupet, Michael O’Hear, Anita Weinberg, Rick Bierschbach, Catherine
Carpenter, and Kay Levine for their helpful comments.
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Sexual development is a significant and natural aspect of the
transition to adulthood, but society and the law rightly recognize
that children and teenagers are a relatively vulnerable and
immature population. Statutory rape laws 1 respond to this
tension with a generalization, setting an age of consent at which
adolescents are deemed mature enough to make safe and
meaningfully consensual decisions about sex. These laws create
a protected class whose sexual autonomy and privacy interests
are restricted in order to protect them from power imbalances
and harmful decision-making. 2
Statutory rape laws have undergone a number of waves of
reform, including a movement towards gender-neutrality and
abandonment of traditional chastity requirements. 3
In a
significant reform trend, many jurisdictions have adopted an
age-gap approach to statutory rape, excluding sex between
close-in-age minors from the reach of statutory rape laws, even
as those minors are deemed legally incapable of consenting to
sex with adults. 4 However, not all sex among minors is covered
by such so-called “Romeo and Juliet” 5 exceptions. Accordingly,
it is often the case that where two minors engage in sexual
contact, each has technically committed statutory rape. 6 This
raises a potential problem: can and should statutory rape laws
be used against members of the class they were designed to
protect?

1. Criminalized sexual activity with a person under a specified age or within a
specified age range is generally known as statutory rape, a strict liability offense, as distinct
from common-law forcible rape—although the term statutory rape “is not used in statutes,
and technically it has no legal meaning.” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy
Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 62 (1992).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See generally CAROLYN COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 12-23 (2004) (explaining the first wave of reform at the turn
of the twentieth century and the second wave of reform in the 1970s and 1980s).
4. Id. at 21-23.
5. Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor
Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 527 n.79 (2008) (“Special, lenient exemptions for
sex among teenage peers are commonly referred to as ‘Romeo and Juliet’ laws, in
recognition of the fact that to stand in the way of a relationship that might blossom into true
love would indeed be a tragedy of Shakespearean proportions.”).
6. See, e.g., In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Pappas v. Zorzi,
No. 11 C 6239, 2013 WL 6254292, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2013).
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To date, most scholarship on the use of statutory rape laws
against minors has focused on an abstract “charmed circle” 7 of
“good” adolescent sex—meaningfully consensual sex among
similarly situated 8 and sufficiently mature teenagers who are
arguably entitled to some measure of sexual privacy and
autonomy—and seems to accepts that the use of statutory rape
laws against the protected class to target minor-minor sex
beyond that circle is less objectionable. This article shifts the
focus to the “contested outer limits” 9 of juvenile sexuality—to
sexual contact among children and adolescents that offends
social norms, leads to harmful outcomes, or appears to be
exploitative. To explore those outer limits, this article adopts
Professor Alan Wertheimer’s distinction between “good” sex
(sex considered morally worthy or at least tolerable); “bad” or
morally unworthy sex; and “wrongful” or morally impermissible
sex. 10 I contend that there are serious constitutional and policy
objections with strict liability statutory rape laws that can be
applied to sexual contact between members of the same
protected class, even in cases where the intended punitive target
is “bad sex” (involving, for example, immature adolescents or
harmful outcomes such as pregnancy) or “wrongful sex”
(involving exploitation of a minor-victim by a minorpredator). 11 Those objections call for statutory and policy
reforms in our approach to sex among adolescents.
In Part II, by way of background, I discuss competing sexnegative and sex-positive discourses on adolescent sexuality; the
contested nature of the normative boundaries between good, bad
and wrongful adolescent sex; and how age of consent laws and
age-gap reforms attempt to account for these complexities.
In Part III, I consider criminal or juvenile statutory rape
proceedings against members of the protected class, which

7. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 281 (Carole
S. Vance ed., 1993); see infra note 19 and accompanying text (arguing that “modern
Western societies appraise sex acts according to a hierarchical system of sexual value” and
diagramming a “charmed circle” of good, normal and natural sexuality).
8. That is, adolescents who are of a similar age and, generally, not in a relationship
that is presumed to involve a status-based power differential such as coach/player,
teacher/student.
9. Rubin, supra note 7.
10. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 5-6 (2003).
11. Id.
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generally take one of two forms: proceedings against both
minors under the theory that each is both victim and offender in
relation to the same act; or one-sided proceedings against the
“true offender.” In either case, there are serious policy and
constitutional problems with using statutory rape laws against a
member of the class such laws are designed to protect. First, the
idea that minors can mutually victimize one another is illogical;
statutory rape proceedings against minors for consensual sex
with minors are in fact a punitive response to sex per se, not
victimization. This conflates two discrete ethical breaches—
fornication and exploitation—and risks both diluting the moral
authority of statutory rape laws and unfairly labeling mere
fornicators as sex abusers.
Even in cases involving good-faith attempts to use statutory
rape laws discerningly to target sex involving victimization of a
vulnerable minor by a predatory minor, selective enforcement of
statutory rape laws against the “true offender” where both
minors are legally violators is predicated on an undefined notion
of exploitation.
This gives rise to the potential for
discriminatory enforcement and over-criminalization of
adolescent sex, based on prosecutorial beliefs about the
normative boundaries of good, bad and wrongful sex.
In Part IV, I discuss how the legal response to sex among
adolescents should be reformulated. Because modern statutory
rape statutes properly presuppose an exploitative victimoffender binary, their use should be confined to cases involving
wrongful, as opposed to merely bad, sex. To that end, the
enforcement of statutory rape laws against minors should be
predicated on a clear and objective definition of exploitation,
which is best achieved by per se rules about the validity of
consent based on presumed age-based power differentials. To
the extent that such measures may fail to fully capture all
instances of arguably wrongful sex—such as sex that is
problematically coercive but not demonstrably nonconsensual—
sex abuse statutes may need to be (1) strengthened to ensure that
fault-based rape laws adequately target coercive but non-forcible
sex among juveniles, and (2) supplemented with juvenilespecific offenses targeting problematic sexual behavior
warranting reformative intervention.
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II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ADOLESCENT
SEXUALITY
A. Contested Boundaries of Good, Bad and Wrongful
Adolescent Sex
American culture is relatively non-permissive with respect
to juvenile 12 sexual activity. 13 Public discourse on sex with and
among adolescents often focuses on their presumed immaturity
and inexperience, their susceptibility to sexual manipulation and
coercion, and adverse outcomes, such as pregnancy and
emotional and physical injury. 14 A significant majority of adults
12. The focus of this article is the use of statutory rape laws against minors those
laws are designed to protect; accordingly, references to juveniles can be taken to mean all
young persons below the legal age of consent, which is sixteen or older in most states.
Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory
Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 703 (2000) [hereinafter Regulating Consensual Sex].
13. STEVI JACKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SEXUALITY, 49, 105 (1982); Floyd M.
Martinson, Sexual Development in Infancy and Childhood, in JUVENILE SEXUAL
OFFENDING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTION 36, 36 (Gail Ryan & Sandy
Lane eds., 2d ed. 1997) (“Sexuality is seldom treated as a strong or healthy force in the
positive development of a child’s personality in the United States.”); Kate Millett, Beyond
Politics? Children and Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE
SEXUALITY 217, 218-20 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1993); Rubin, supra note 7, at 268-75;
LAURA J. ZILNEY & LISA ANNE ZILNEY, PERVERTS AND PREDATORS: THE MAKING OF
SEXUAL OFFENDING LAWS 177 (2009) (“America is a sex-negative country . . . .”); Peggy
Orenstein, When Did Porn Become Sex Ed?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/when-did-porn-become-sexed.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/B3MN-76K2].
14. “Though the public knows teens are having sex, and supports sex education in
the schools, this is not an endorsement of sex for teens. They want teens to wait.” MEG
BOSTROM, FRAMEWORKS INSTITUTE, THE 21ST CENTURY TEEN: PUBLIC PERCEPTION
AND
TEEN
REALITY
21
(2001),
http://frameworksinstitute.org/assets/files/PDF/youth_public_perceptions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2W3T-VTAQ]. Policy measures aimed at promoting abstinence still
abound in America. Id. at 20 (reporting that 58% of schools teach that “young people
should wait to have sex, but if they don’t they should use birth control and practice safer
sex” and 34% teach that “young people should only have sex when they are married”).
See, e.g., Ron Stodghill II, Where’d You Learn That?, TIME, June 15, 1998, at 15 (“We
should not confuse kids’ pseudo-sophistication about sexuality and their ability to use the
language with their understanding of who they are as sexual young people or their ability to
make good decisions.”); COCCA, supra note 3, at 32 (noting the “moral panic” of
Americans in the 80s/90s about “children having children”); R. KACHUR ET AL., CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ADOLESCENTS, TECHNOLOGY AND REDUCING
RISK FOR HIV, STDS AND PREGNANCY 7 (2013) (“[Teens] remain a vulnerable population
when it comes to sexual risk.”); Laina Y. Bay-Cheng, The Trouble of Teen Sex: The
Construction of Adolescent Sexuality Through School-Based Sexuality Education, 3 SEX
EDUC. 61, 61 (2003) (arguing that school-based sexuality education “attends exclusively to
the dangers and risks associated with teen sex”); Elizabeth Hollenberg, The
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believe that premarital sex among teens is wrong, 15 and this
moral disapproval has been consistently high since the 1980s.16
In one sense, then, we might say that there is no such thing as
“good” adolescent sex—according to majority American social
norms, sex among unmarried adolescents is per se morally
unworthy and undesirable. 17 However, a competing discourse
of sex positivity acknowledges the sexual dimension of
development, and recognizes that mutually agreed upon
adolescent sexual encounters can in certain contexts be a normal
and healthy aspect of the transition to adulthood, and are not per
se morally problematic, undesirable or unsafe. 18

Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood,
10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 268 (1999) (discussing the political narrative of the
“teenage mother as child victim”); Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statutory Rape Law and
Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463, 468-72 (2000)
(discussing the mid-1990s welfare reform movement’s focus on the problem of teen
pregnancy); A History of Federal Funding for Abstinence-Only-Until Marriage Programs,
SEXUALITY
INFO.
&
EDUC.
COUNCIL
OF
THE
U.S.,
http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1340&nodeid=1
[https://perma.cc/SG53-BCUZ]. But see infra note 35.
15. General Social Survey 2006, THE ASS’N OF RELIGION DATA ARCHIVES,
http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/GSS2006.asp
[https://perma.cc/DV9G-AQ2M] (noting 71.4% of survey participants responded that
premarital heterosexual sex among fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds is “always wrong,”
compared to 25.6% responding to adult premarital sex as “always wrong”).
16. BOSTROM, supra note 14 (reporting on National Opinion Research Center’s
General Social Surveys, which show that the “always wrong” response to teens having sex
before marriage has “hovered in the high 60s throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a
high of 71% in 1998, and a low of 66% in 1986.”). But see COCCA, supra note 3, at 30-32
(noting potential problems with the wording of the General Social Survey teen sex
question, but concluding that the surveys still overwhelmingly condemn adolescent sex).
17. COCCA, supra note 3, at 33.
18. Bay-Cheng, supra note 14, at 65 (noting that “a growing number of experts in
the field of adolescent sexuality . . . argue for the presentation of sexuality as a positive and
healthy aspect of life . . . and for the need to help adolescents determine not only when to
say ‘no,’ but when to say ‘yes,’ as well”); see WERTHEIMER, supra note 10, at 217, 220
(noting that “there is considerable controversy with respect to the harmfulness of youthful
sex,” discussing arguments that consensual sex by minors is “no big deal,” and noting that
at least some of the harm of adolescent sexual activity is “socially constructed” and derives
from social norms about the impropriety of early sexual relations); JUDITH LEVINE,
HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX (2002) (arguing
that sexual pleasure is not inherently unsafe for children and teens); ZILNEY & ZILNEY,
supra note 13, xiv (2009) (adopting a “sex-positive viewpoint, meaning that sex is good—
and good for you—and that society must learn to deal with it in a more open, forthright
manner”); Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory
Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 322-23 (1997) (discussing positive aspects of
adolescent sexuality).
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To explore the intersection of these two perspectives,
Professor Sutherland adopts Gayle Rubin’s hierarchical
approach to sexuality, which posits a “charmed circle” of
sexuality that is privileged by society and deemed “normal,
natural, blessed”; and “outer limits” of sex that is considered
“abnormal, unnatural, damned.” 19 Sutherland considers how
factors such as gender, class, race, sexual orientation, outcomes
(pregnancy, sexually transmitted disease), and age impact social
tolerance for adolescent sexuality. 20 Sutherland’s analysis
points to a useful starting point for the current article: the
normative boundary between morally “good” and morally “bad”
adolescent sex is both dynamic and contested.
Of course, some types of sexual interactions are nearuniversally condemned as not only bad or morally unworthy, but
as incontrovertibly wrongful or morally impermissible—most
obviously, sex involving intentional manipulation, coercion, or
exploitation of the young and vulnerable. 21 As Floyd Martinson
notes, “[a]lthough we do not yet have societal agreement about
what constitutes age-appropriate child sexual behavior, we do
have a universal norm that infants and children should not be
sexually abused.” 22 But even here, there is not always a clear
dividing line between sexual activity and sexual abuse,
acceptable persuasion and impermissible coercion, consent and
nonconsent, or childhood incapacity and coming-of-age
competence. 23 This causes analytical complexity when it comes
to regulating juvenile sexual behavior.

B. Age of Consent and Age Span Rules as BrightLine Proxies for Contested Boundaries
19. Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the
Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 335 (2003); see
also Rubin, supra note 7, at 280-81.
20. Sutherland, supra note 19, at 353 (“The center of the charmed circle would be
made up of heterosexual sex between white, middle-class teenage peers who are engaged
in monogamous relationships. Various sexual acts short of intercourse would be okay
between younger teenagers, while intercourse would be okay for those who have attained a
certain age and have taken appropriate precautions to avoid pregnancy and STD’s.”).
21. See infra Part IV.A, for a discussion on the meaning of sexual exploitation.
22. Martinson, supra note 13, at 53.
23. Oliveri, supra note 14, at 485 (noting that the sexual encounters of adolescents
often take place in “the gray area between consent and coercion”).
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Statutory rape laws respond to this complexity with a
generalization, by setting an age at which adolescents are
deemed sufficiently mature to make safe and meaningfully
consensual decisions about sex, and at which point sexual
activity is no longer per se legally impermissible. The age of
consent thereby functions as a bright-line proxy for the
boundary between wrongful sex, involving a presumptively
incompetent and exploited juvenile, and good or at least morally
permissible sex.24 This approach involves a legal fiction,
because the childhood-adulthood transition is a continuum, not a
switch, 25 and all adolescents traverse the transition, from
vulnerability and immaturity to autonomy and competence, at
different speeds, meaning “any one teen . . . might not fit into
the model.” 26
A more nuanced approach is to recognize that the
competence of juveniles to meaningfully and responsibly
consent to sex and resist sexual manipulation and coercion is
dependent not only on the juvenile’s age, but also on contextual
factors such as the relative ages of the sexual partners and the
nature of the sexual activity in question. For example, in
Consent to Sexual Relations, Professor Wertheimer notes the
argument that:
[Y]oung females are more competent to navigate the
world of adolescent/adolescent relationships than the
world of adolescent/adult relationships . . . . [I]t is
possible that the decision-making of young females is
more likely to be distorted by transference or respect
for authority or status seeking when they are
24. See generally WERTHEIMER, supra note 10, at 215-22 (discussing age as a proxy
for the emotional and cognitive capacities that are relevant to the validity of consent);
Millett, supra note 13, at 222 (“[C]onditions between adults and children preclude any
sexual relationship that is not in some sense exploitative.”).
25. Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 279, 305 (2010) (“[T]here is enough sociological evidence that [a neurological
moment when young people fully understand sex, their sexual choices, and the
ramifications of sex acts] is illusory . . . .”).
26. Oliveri, supra note 14, at 485; Fischel, supra note 25, at 305 (noting that
“education, safer sex education, resources, gender, regional location, family dynamics, and
politics all mediate, dampen, empower, or in other ways give shape to a young person’s
sexual agency and her ability to consent.”); see also Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy,
Please: Should We Punish Parents for Teenage Sex?, 89 KY. L.J. 135, 163 (2000) (noting
that the divergence in ages of consent from state to state is “evidence of this lack of
consensus over the point at which a sexual relationship becomes harmful to one or both
teens and the relative arbitrariness of any number.”).
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contemplating relationships with older males, or that
the risks consequent to adolescent/adolescent
relationships are small compared with adolescent/adult
relationships. 27

In this vein, most jurisdictions have abandoned the single
age of consent approach 28 in favor of age-gap reforms, which
eliminate strict liability for certain degrees of sexual contact
between minors within certain specified age differentials. 29 This
approach attempts to leave space for normal adolescent sexuality
and some degree of sexual autonomy and privacy, while also
safeguarding against age-disparity-based power imbalances that
may impact young people as they navigate their sexual
development. 30
The age-gap approach indicates a shift in the legal response
to adolescent sexuality, away from proscribing all adolescent
sex per se. 31 Instead, the focus turns to the prevention of
potentially exploitative sexual relations, with age disparity
functioning as a workable if imperfect proxy of inequality and
thus coercion. 32 This does not necessarily indicate moral

27. WERTHEIMER, supra note 10, at 218-19; see also Fischel, supra note 25, at 301
(noting “relations of power and dependency in young people’s lives that constrain
consent’s transformative force . . . .”); Am. Acad. of Family Physicians et al., Protecting
Adolescents: Ensuring Access to Care and Reporting Sexual Activity and Abuse, 35 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 420, 422 (2004) (noting that an adolescent’s age and disparity in
years between an adolescent and her sexual partner are key factors in determining whether
health care providers should report the relationship to authorities as abusive); Michelle
Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and the Potential for
Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 799,
813 (2001) [hereinafter Master’s House] (noting that “[i]t may be accurate to assume that
the wider the age gap between partners, the greater the chance of coercion.”).
28. See generally Susan M. Kole, Annotation, Statute Protecting Minors in a
Specified Age Range from Rape or Other Sexual Activity as Applicable to Defendant Minor
Within Protected Age Group, 18 A.L.R.5th 856 (1994) (discussing how only twelve states
have a single age of consent, below which an individual cannot consent to sexual
intercourse under any circumstances, and above which it is legal to engage in sexual
intercourse with another person above the age of consent).
29. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)-(b) (West 2015) (stating
“Indecency with a Child” as sexual contact with someone less than seventeen years of age
and where the defendant is 3 or more years older than the victim).
30. COCCA, supra note 3, at 60 (“Age spans assume that an age difference in the teen
years is rife with the potential for manipulation or abuse.”).
31. Fischel, supra note 25, at 311.
32. Id. (noting age-span reforms “aim at eliminating coercion, not sex”); COCCA,
supra note 3, at 19 (“Age acts as a proxy for a power differential that is suspect of
coercion.”); WERTHEIMER, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that wide age spans may not be
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approval of premarital sex among close-in-age teenagers, but a
prioritization of coercive sexual relations rather than sex per se
as the primary punitive target of statutory rape laws. 33 This
reform trend is congruent with evidence more generally of
growing societal acceptance of the reality of adolescent
sexuality. For example, most states have decriminalized or
ceased prosecuting fornication, 34 and there is increasingly strong
support for school-based sex education that goes beyond the
“abstinence only” message. 35

III. The Use of Statutory Rape Laws Against
Members of the Protected Class
Sex involving adolescents has been described as a
“prominent bogeyman,” in that rates are lower than is commonly
believed. 36 Nonetheless, intercourse and other sexual acts are
common among American youth, including among those who

“inherently coercive, [but] they might be a good proxy for coercion that is difficult to
observe directly . . . .”).
33. See Fischel, supra note 25, at 341.
34. COCCA, supra note 3, at 170 n.39 (noting that “[m]ost states have taken their
fornication statutes off the books.”). But see JoAnne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The Rise,
Fall, and Continuing Uses of Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 127, 171 (2014) (noting that although fornication is “not routinely prosecuted,” such
laws can still be enforced and “[j]uveniles are particularly vulnerable . . . because courts are
more willing to overrule their asserted privacy rights . . . .”); Sara Boboltz, 8 Laws to Keep
Women in Line That are Somehow Still on the Books, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2014,
11:54 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/14/state-laws-women_n_4937387.html
[https://perma.cc/6WUG-3AWF] (noting Massachusetts, Virginia, Georgia, Idaho,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Utah, and South Carolina still have fornication offenses on the
books).
35. Susan N. Wilson, Sexuality Education: Our Current Status, and an Agenda for
2010, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 252, 253 (2000) (reporting that “80-90% of Americans say
they favor courses that teach contraception and disease prevention in addition to
abstinence; that 70% oppose federal funding for programs that prohibit teaching about
condoms and contraceptives; [and] that 69% say teaching abstinence until marriage is ‘just
not realistic’”). In April 2015, seventy-five billion dollars in federal funding for school
sexual abstinence education programs was passed. Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 214(a)(2), 129 Stat. 87, 152 (2015). However,
President Obama has cut funding for abstinence-only funding in his 2017 budget due to a
lack of proven effectiveness. President Obama Cuts Funding for All Abstinence-Only Sex
Education, N.Y. TIMES: WOMEN IN THE WORLD (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2016/02/18/president-obama-cuts-fundingfor-all-abstinence-only-sex-education/ [https://perma.cc/8ZMG-LKNR].
36. Lawrence B. Finer & Jesse M. Philbin, Sexual Initiation, Contraceptive Use, and
Pregnancy Among Young Adolescents, 131 PEDIATRICS 886, 887 (2013).
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are legally unable to consent: ages of consent vary across
jurisdictions from ten to eighteen, with sixteen being the most
common; 37 and about twenty percent of fifteen-year-olds have
had sex. 38 Where a minor’s sexual partner is also a minor but
sufficiently close in age, age-span provisions may eliminate
liability for statutory rape, thereby removing conventionally
consensual sex among peers from the reach of the law. 39
However, such “Romeo and Juliet” provisions 40 often do not
apply to sex among minors under a certain age; 41 may reduce
but not eliminate liability; 42 and are not found in all
jurisdictions. 43

37. See Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain’t So Sweet: Rethinking the Regulation of
Adolescent Sexuality, MICH. J. GENDER & L. 271, 312-13 (2011).
38. Finer & Philbin, supra note 36, at 888 (reporting that 19% of fifteen-year-old
females have had sex; figures for young males are slightly higher); see Paul R. Abramson
& Annaka Abramson, Smells Like Teen Spirit: The Conundrum of Kids, Sex, and the Law,
in CHILDREN, SEXUALITY, AND THE LAW 6, 10-12 (Sacha M. Coupet & Ellen Marrus eds.,
2015) (discussing the difficulties of obtaining reliable data pertaining to juvenile sexual
activity).
39. See Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual
Activity Between Teenagers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 390 (2003).
Nonconsensual sex could, of course, still be prosecuted by proving forcible rape. State ex
rel. Juv. Dep’t of Multnomah Cty. v. Kitt, 879 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that age-span statutes provide “a defense when the alleged lack of consent is based
solely on incapacity due to the victim’s age” and “is inapposite when there is an actual lack
of consent”).
40. There is technically a difference between age-span provisions, which
decriminalize sex between close-in-age minors, and “Romeo and Juliet” clauses, which
provide an affirmative defense if the victim and offender are sufficiently close in age. See
Danielle Flynn, All the Kids Are Doing It: The Unconstitutionality of Enforcing Statutory
Rape Laws Against Children & Teenagers, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 681, 687-91 (2013). The
terms are used interchangeably herein.
41. In twenty-seven states, statutes specify a “minimum age of consent” below
which an adolescent cannot legally engage in sexual intercourse regardless of the age of the
defendant. ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., STATUTORY
RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 7 (2004). See also
Kitrosser, supra note 18, at 314 (noting that “[a]ge span provisions are generally limited to
adolescents . . . [and do not apply to] sexual activity with children below a certain preadolescent age.”); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1(1).
42. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(c) (West 2016) (noting statutory rape is
considered a misdemeanor if the victim is fourteen or fifteen years of age and the defendant
is no more than three years older).
43. GLOSSER ET AL., supra note 41. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.02(2) (2015)
(noting individuals under the age of sixteen are deemed incapable of consent under all
circumstances); NEW HAMPSHIRE REVISED STATUTES § 632-A:3 (a child under sixteen
years of age is unable to consent to sexual intercourse with anyone other than his or her
spouse).
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In jurisdictions without applicable age-span provisions, and
in the absence of a specified minimum age of defendant to
confine the use of statutory rape laws to adult defendants, 44
minor-minor sexual activity can result in criminal prosecution or
delinquency adjudication against one or both of the minors
involved. This Section critically evaluates this use of statutory
rape laws as a sword against a member of the class the laws
were designed to shield.
A number of commentators have persuasively argued that
statutory rape proceedings are a disproportionate and unjust
response to conventionally consensual 45 sex among similarly
situated adolescents, and that reforms should be implemented to
exclude such sex from the scope of criminal and juvenile law. 46
44. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.364(6) (West 2015) (defining statutory
sexual seduction as sex with someone less than 16 years of age where the defendant is at
least eighteen years of age); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 309 (Vt. 2000) (holding that
Vermont’s statutory rape laws are only applicable in cases where the defendant is at least
sixteen years of age). But see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.230(1)(b) (West 2015)
(defining lewdness with a child as committing lewd or lascivious acts—not amounting to
penetration—with someone less than fourteen years of age “with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires” of the defendant or the
victim; there is no minimum age of defendant).
45. I use the term “conventionally consensual” to refer to voluntary and welcome
participation in sexual activity (compared to mere acquiescence), despite a lack of capacity
to legally consent to sex. Voluntariness or actual consent is no defense to statutory rape, as
minors are deemed legally unable to consent to sex. See generally Jennifer Ann Drobac,
Consent, Teenagers, and (un)Civil(ized) Consequences, in CHILDREN, SEXUALITY, AND
THE LAW (Sacha M. Coupet & Ellen Marrus eds., 2015) (discussing the legal significance
of voluntariness in relation to civil sexual harassment cases involving minor plaintiffs).
46. See, e.g., Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat
Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 755-56
(2008); Fischel, supra note 25, at 300-08; Flynn, supra note 40, at 713; Jordan Franklin,
Where Art Thou, Privacy?: Expanding Privacy Rights of Minors in Regard to Consensual
Sex: Statutory Rape Laws and the Need for a “Romeo and Juliet” Exception in Illinois, 46
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 326-31 (2012); Michele Goodwin, Law’s Limits: Regulating
Statutory Rape Law, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 481, 530-31; Steve James, Romeo and Juliet Were
Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 78 UMKC L.
REV. 241, 256-61 (2009); Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young
“Sex Offenders”: How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform
Daily Practice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 508-14 (2006); Siji A. Moore, Note, Out of the Fire
and Into the Frying Pan: Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to Regulate Teen Sex Through the
Criminal Justice System, 52 HOW. L.J. 197, 229-30 (2008); Daryl J. Olszewski, Statutory
Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale, and the Need for Reform, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 693,
710 (2006); Lisa Pearlstein, Note, Walking the Tightrope of Statutory Rape Law: Using
International Legal Standards to Serve the Best Interests of Juvenile Offenders and
Victims, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 126 (2010); Phipps, supra note 39, at 437-38; Emily J.
Stine, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to Classifying
Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1195-1207 (2011).
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Such arguments are often premised on claims about
constitutional privacy and substantive due process rights as they
pertain to consensual sex among older teenagers. 47 But the
further we move away from the “charmed circle” of
meaningfully consensual sex among similarly situated and
sufficiently mature teens, the more controversial the issue of
juvenile sex becomes. And the “protected class” question—
whether laws designed as a shield can and should be used as a
sword against that protected class—has received far less scrutiny
in relation to “bad” and “wrongful” sex: sex involving children
at the cusp of adolescence, sex that results in pregnancy or
infection, and sex at the blurred margins between consent and
nonconsent, voluntariness and coercion. This Section discusses
constitutional and policy objections to the use of statutory rape
laws against the protected class, even in cases where the
objective is to protect minors from harmful sex or sexual
exploitation.

A. Prosecuting Juvenile Sexual Partners for
Consensual “Bad Sex” Obfuscates Fornication and
Exploitation
When Z.C. was thirteen years old, she had sex with a
twelve-year-old boy and became pregnant. 48 Utah takes a twotier approach to statutory rape, meaning age-span provisions
were only applicable to adolescents fourteen years and older. 49
There were no Romeo and Juliet provisions applicable to
offenders under the age of fourteen (“children” under the
statutory scheme). The state filed delinquency proceedings
against both children for sexual abuse of a child. 50 The boy was
adjudicated delinquent; Z.C. chose to fight the delinquency
petition on constitutional grounds. 51
As the Utah Court of Appeals noted, the proceedings
against Z.C. and her sexual partner were ironic, in that they were
deemed by law to be too young to consent to sex, yet were also
47. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Statutory Rape in a Post Lawrence v. Texas World,
58 SMU L. REV. 77, 80-88 (2005); Oliveri, supra note 14, at 486-89.
48. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1207 (Utah 2007).
49. Id. at 1208.
50. Id. at 1207; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1(1)(b), (2) (West 2016) (prohibiting
sexual contact with a child under the age of fourteen).
51. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1207.
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deemed “able to form the intent to commit what would be a
felony if committed by an adult.” 52 Nonetheless, the court
reluctantly upheld the delinquency petition, finding that the lack
of any age-span provision or mitigating factors applicable to
“children” was rationally related to the legitimate legislative
objective of “protecting the health and safety of young children,
not only from older predators, but also from each other.” 53 Z.C.
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 54
The sexual contact in question was described, on appeal, as
mutually welcome. In other words, although both Z.C. and her
partner were legally unable to consent to intercourse, the sex
was found to be conventionally consensual. 55 But are twelveand thirteen-year-olds really capable of consenting to sex, with
all its emotional and developmental implications, in a
meaningful way? The fact that pregnancy resulted would seem
to indicate a lack of appreciation on the children’s part of the
possible ramifications of their choices (although the same could
be said of many intimate relationships among adults). Even
apart from outcomes such as pregnancy, sexual activity among
children aged thirteen, twelve or even younger evokes a
different moral response to sex between, for example, two
emotionally mature sixteen-year-olds who take responsible
protective measures and look out for one another’s needs and
interests. Clearly our tolerance for young love has its limits—at
some point, Romeo and Juliet are considered too young for
voluntary sex to be healthy, normal, socially desirable or safe.
As Professor Wertheimer argues:
Even if B’s consent is given completely willingly
and even if there is no deception, B’s token of consent
is morally transformative only if she is suitably
competent, that is, only if she has the requisite
emotional and cognitive capacities . . . . [W]e can
understand the need for these requirements in terms of
both autonomy and utility.
An agent’s age is
autonomous or self-directing when she is motivated by
her appreciation of the reasons provided by her
52. State ex rel. Z.C. v. State, 128 P.3d 561, 566, n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 2005); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1(2) (requiring “intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain
to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”).
53. State ex rel. Z.C., 128 P.3d at 566.
54. See State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2007).
55. Id. at 1207, n.1.
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situation.
One who lacks certain cognitive or
emotional capacities is not capable of making decisions
consistent with those reasons . . . . [S]he may be unable
to make choices that are consistent with her deepest
values or preferences because those have not been
formed . . . . From a utilitarian or “mutual benefit”
account of consensual transactions . . . when an agent’s
cognitive and emotional capacities are impaired, we
have less reason to assume that her decision will
promote her interests. 56

In other words, sexual contact among children and young
adolescents may be voluntary, but at some point of juvenility, it
is not properly considered “good” sex. In that light, delinquency
proceedings, such as those brought against Z.C., may be an
effective means of responding to concerning sexual behavior
with guiding and reformative supervision.
However, there are strong principle and policy objections
to using statutory rape laws against consenting minors even in
relation to “bad sex” where those minors are uncomfortably
young or where sex results in bad outcomes such as
impregnation of a thirteen-year-old. 57

1. Harmful Sex Is Not Necessarily Wrongful Sex
First, as a preliminary point, I contend that if the sexual
activity is noncoercive, mutually consensual, or voluntary, and
occurs in a context of equality, it is not properly characterized as
exploitative.58 In other words, it does not involve victimization
and there is no victim-offender binary. Of course, children who
become sexually active with other children at a young age may
experience direct or indirect harm—negative physical,
psychological or emotional outcomes—as a result. 59 In this
sense, we might consider them to be victims of the sexual
activity or “victims of harm,” but they are not, in the absence of

56. WERTHEIMER, supra note 10, at 215.
57. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1212-13.
58. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing exploitation as comprised of elements of
inequality, coercion and (non)consent).
59. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994) (“[S]exual activity with a child
opens the door to sexual exploitation, physical harm, and sometimes psychological
damage . . . .”).
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exploitation, victims of another’s abuse or wrongdoing. 60 In
other words, the fact that one or both children experience harm
does not render the other a wrongful aggressor or victimizer.
It is no answer to say that each is both victim and
perpetrator in relation to the same act, or that each is a victim of
the other. 61 This either conflates “victim of harm” with “victim
of wrongdoing,” or implies that there is such a thing as mutual
sexual exploitation, which defies common sense. 62 Further, as
the Z.C. court reasoned, “it would be unthinkable to file even
‘civil’ juvenile court proceedings against a true victim of such a
heinous crime.” 63 In other words, even if children under a
certain age are considered to lack the competence to
meaningfully consent to sexual conduct, such that their
voluntary sexual activity with one another can never be
considered truly consensual, this presumed victimhood should
also preclude treatment as victimizer. 64

60. WERTHEIMER, supra note 10, at 96 (noting the distinction between “A’s act
harms B” and “A’s act exploits B”); R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
13, 17 (2001) (arguing that “harm as a setback to interests . . . need not be wrongful”); see
infra notes 146-151 and accompanying text (discussing the question of pregnancy, sexually
transmitted disease, or loss of virginity as victimization).
61. See, e.g., In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding that
“where . . . two minors engage in a consensual sexual act, the [statutory rape] statute may
validly be applied to prosecute both minors on the basis that each is the victim of the
other”); State v. Colton M., 875 N.W.2d 642, 647 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that “a
juvenile under the age [of consent] could be both a victim and an offender under the
[statutory rape] statute”).
62. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., concurring) (noting
that a reading of a statute that indicates both minors have committed the crime “effectively
means each child was both aggressor and victim in a single act, which stretches credence to
the breaking point”); In re Frederick, 622 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1993)
(finding it would be absurd to charge two minors with the rape of the other).
63. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1212 n.8 (Utah 2007) (concluding that “the
State’s double prosecution of these children is best characterized as charging both as
perpetrators for the same act”).
64. Queen v. Tyrrell [1894] QB 710 at 710 (Eng.) (holding that a person for whose
protection an offence has been created cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a person
who commits the offence against her), cited in Robert H. Wood, The Failure of Sexting
Criminalization: A Plea for the Exercise of Prosecutorial Restraint, 16 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 151, 171 (2009) (arguing that “the class of persons a statute is meant to
protect should not be subject to punishment under the statute”). Cf. In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d
at 636 (holding that T.W., a minor, who had conventionally consensual sex with another
minor “relinquished his right to protection and was subject to prosecution [for statutory
rape]” once he “assumed the status of an accused”).
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2. Statutory Rape Laws Should Be Confined to
Wrongful Sex to Preserve Their Moral Authority and
to Avoid Labeling Fornicators as Abusers
The use of age of consent laws against two conventionally
consenting minors is thus properly characterized as a punitive
response to sex per se, not abusive sex. 65 As the Utah Supreme
Court said in dismissing Z.C.’s delinquency petition, where a
sex abuse statute is applied to two consenting minors, “there is
no discernible victim [of abuse] that the law seeks to protect,
only culpable participants that the State seeks to punish.” 66
Such applications are objectionable for two reasons. First,
sexual exploitation and fornication are distinct ethical
breaches. 67 The former involves victimization and violates an
uncontested moral norm: do not abuse the relative vulnerability
of another for your own sexual gratification. 68 By contrast,
fornication is a victimless 69 and contested moral breach. 70 As
society becomes more accommodating of adolescent autonomy
and privacy interests, statutory rape laws are typically
understood and justified as a necessary incursion on those
interests in order to protect young persons from sexual

65. COCCA, supra note 3, at 167 (arguing that the prosecution of same-age
consensual adolescent relationships “illuminates what may be the substantive purpose of
statutory rape laws . . . often obscured with rhetoric about protecting the young and
vulnerable, and that is to discourage nonmarital sexuality”); Fischel, supra note 25, at 300
(“Criminalizing sexual activity among minors condemns sex, not coercion . . . .”).
66. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1212 (finding that the application of the statute to
Z.C. for mutually welcome sex with another child produced an absurd result not intended
by the legislature). Of course, the question of whether sex is meaningfully consensual is
not always straightforward. See infra Part II.B (discussing the use of statutory rape laws
against minors to target exploitative sex involving coercion or nonconsent and the issue of
borderline/gray cases).
67. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1212 (noting that fornication “differ[s] from sexual
assault crimes . . . in both the theory and degree of punishment. Rather than punishing an
actor who has perpetrated a crime against a victim, these laws demonstrate the legislature’s
disapproval of the acts of both participants for violating a moral standard . . . . Because
these crimes do not involve a victim, they involve a lesser degree of punishment”).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1(2) (West 2016).
69. Compare victim in the sense of “victim as one who is wronged” and “victim as
one who is harmed.” As discussed above, fornication may result in harm to one or both of
the minors involved; this does not mean one or both minors were exploited or wronged.
70. See supra notes 12–18. Although a majority of Americans consider premarital
teenage sex to be morally wrong, this rhetoric intersects with sex positivity discourse, and
there is increasing recognition that sex can be a healthy aspect of maturation into
adulthood.
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exploitation.71 To use such laws to target fornication implies
moral equivalence between fornication and exploitation, sex per
se and sexual abuse, bad (morally unworthy) sex and wrongful
(morally impermissible) sex. This dilutes the stigma and moral
authority of statutory rape laws. 72 In other words, the role of
sexual abuse laws is properly protective, rather than proscriptive
of a moral standard. Statutory rape laws should therefore be
confined to targeting the specific ethical breach of exploitation,
not merely sex that a prosecutor (rightly or wrongly) considers
morally unworthy. 73
71. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO
ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING, 126 (2004) (arguing that the “justification for adult
punishment—the exploitation of the young—is missing from settings in which both
participants are young”); Sutherland, supra note 19, at 315 (noting that “[t]he justification
usually put forward for age of consent laws is the protection of young persons from sexual
exploitation by adults”); Cohen, supra note 46, at 723 (“[S]tatutory rape laws are
absolutely imperative to protect minors from sexual predators.”); see WERTHEIMER, supra
note 10, at 96. Prosecutors typically confine statutory rape proceedings to cases involving
suspected exploitation, nonconsent, or coercion. Cf. In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 637-38
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding that closeness in age of minor statutory rape defendant and his
consenting partner did not override legislature’s purpose in enacting the statute, which was
to protect thirteen- to sixteen-year-olds from engaging in premature sexual behavior
regardless of their partners’ age); In re James P., 115 Cal. App. 3d 681, 685 (1981)
(explaining that the statutory rape statute was “enacted primarily to protect children from
those influences which would tend to cause them to become involved in idle or immoral
conduct”).
72. Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 910 (1962) (arguing that laws that “purport to bring
within the condemnation of the criminal statute kinds of activities whose moral neutrality,
if not innocence, is widely recognized . . . raise basic issues of a morally acceptable
criminal code”); In re Frederick, 622 N.E.2d 762, 763 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1993) (finding
that prosecution of fourteen-year-old juvenile for consensual sex with twelve-year-old
“victim” would “belittle[] the legitimate suffering of other rape victims”). A similar
argument could be made in relation to prosecuting consensual “sexting” among teenagers
as child pornography. See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, When Sex and Cell Phones
Collide: Inside the Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
1, 24-25 (2009).
73. My argument does not necessarily implicate statutory rape as applied to adultminor sex—where conventionally consensual adult-minor sex is deemed exploitative due
to the fact that one participant is an adult, a legal fiction that is widely accepted as an
important means of protecting minors from predatory adults—but it is congruent with calls
for close-in-age exceptions in relation to such sexual encounters to try to exclude nonabusive sex from the scope of statutory rape prosecutions generally. For discussions on
whether statutory rape law as applied to adult-minor sex should be reformed to incorporate
a consent-based standard that better confines the focus to coercive, as opposed to
consensual sex, see generally Kitrosser, supra note 18, arguing that simple age-based
restrictions on sex with minors obfuscate any meaningful inquiry into consent, coercion,
and power imbalances; Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory
Rape, Meaningful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73
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Second, there are serious consequences for juvenile
offenders who are labeled “child abuser” as opposed to
“fornicator.” As the court in Z.C. noted, “labeling [a minor]
with the moniker of ‘child abuser,’ even within the juvenile
court system, can have serious consequences” including lifelong sex offender registration, severe social stigmatization, and
loss of reputation. 74 Accordingly, the use of sex abuse statutes
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205 (1998) (arguing that courts should consider whether a teen gave
meaningful consent to an adult sex partner by analyzing the nature of the relationship
between the parties and the nature of the sexual encounter). Cf. Oliveri, supra note 14, at
482; Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 68-70 (1994) [hereinafter Turning Girls Into
Women].
74. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Utah 2007). See also People ex rel. J.L.,
800 N.W.2d 720, 725 (S.D. 2011) (Meierhenry, J., concurring) (noting the severe
consequences of labeling a fourteen-year-old who had consensual sex with his twelve-yearold girlfriend a sex offender for life, and arguing that those consequences “are far afield
from the intended purpose of a juvenile petition of ‘affording guidance, control, and
rehabilitation’” and that “[b]randing this child a rapist and life-long sex offender almost
assures he cannot succeed as a productive juvenile or adult”); In re B.A.M., 806 A.2d 893,
895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting the penalties for violation by a juvenile of a statutory
rape statute “are severe . . . and the nature of the crime is one which, at the very least,
reflects badly on the character of the offender”); Catherine L. Carpenter, Against Juvenile
Sex Offender Registration, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (2014) (arguing that juvenile sex
offender registration is cruel and unusual punishment); PHIL RICH, UNDERSTANDING,
ASSESSING, AND REHABILITATING JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDERS 24 (2d ed. 2011)
(“When it comes to labeling a child or adolescent as a sexual offender or its softer
counterpart, a sexually abusive youth, we should be careful. The very same behaviors in
adults and juveniles may be distinguished from one another by situation, circumstances,
and developmental age and experience, as well as by intent, depth of comprehension,
and . . . moral implication.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RAISED ON THE REGISTRY: THE
IRREPARABLE HARM OF PLACING CHILDREN ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES IN THE U.S.
(2013),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0513_ForUpload_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KK86-GQJW]; ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N, IMPROVING ILLINOIS’
RESPONSE TO SEXUAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY YOUTH: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 38-50, 72-76 (2014). For a discussion of whether juveniles should
ever be subject to sex offender registration is beyond the scope of this article, see generally
CAMILLE GIBSON & DONNA M. VANDIVER, JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS: WHAT THE
PUBLIC NEEDS TO KNOW 70-71, 184-92 (2008); Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of
Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and CommunityNotification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163 (2003) (arguing that sex offender
registration “magnif[ies] the harm without actually mitigating the occurrence of abuse”);
Elizabeth J. Letourneau & Michael F. Caldwell, Expensive, Harmful Policies That Don’t
Work or How Juvenile Sexual Offending is Addressed in the U.S., 8 INT’L J. BEHAV.
CONSULTATION & THERAPY 23 (2013) (recommending that sexual offender registration be
revised to exclude juveniles); In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 19-20 (Pa. 2014) (finding that
mandatory lifelong sex offender registration as applied to juveniles is unconstitutional); In
re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio 2012) (finding lifetime registration for juveniles
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
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as a response to mere fornication is disproportionate and
arguably constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 75
In short, if the criminal law seeks to proscribe a moral
standard by targeting non-exploitative but potentially harmful or
morally proscribed behavior, such as consensual fornication
among younger minors, protective sexual abuse offenses, which
presuppose a perpetrator and a victim, 76 are not the appropriate
tool. 77
75. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 262 (Fla. 1995) (Grimes, C.J., dissenting) (“If B.B.
is adjudicated delinquent of a second-degree felony, he may have an argument that the
particular sanction imposed upon him for having sex with another sixteen-year-old is cruel
and unusual punishment.”); In re Pima Cty. Juvenile Appeal No. 74802-2, 790 P.2d 723,
732 (Ariz. 1990) (noting petitioner’s policy argument that “it is unfair to brand innocent
teenage behavior as criminal” and acknowledging that the “present statute could lead to a
harsh result in a given case”); see also Flynn, supra note 40, at 694-97.
76. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d at 1211 (“[L]ike all forms of sexual assault, child sex
abuse presupposes that a single act of abuse involves a victim, whom the statute endeavors
to protect, and a perpetrator, whom the statute punishes for harming the victim.”).
77. Id. at 1212, n.9 (noting that delinquency proceedings against Z.C. under statutory
rape provisions “begs the question of why the prosecutor could not have accomplished the
intended result by basing the delinquency petition on a victimless offense that more
accurately fits the conduct at issue”); In re B.A.M., 806 A.2d at 897-98 (finding statutory
rape statutes were “designed to protect children from exploitation by their elders,” that it
would be absurd to prosecute consensual sexual activity between minors, and that the “law
was not intended to render criminal per se the experimentation carried on by young
children, even where the acts may evoke disapprobation or censure”); cf. State v. J.A.S.,
686 So. 2d 1366, 1368-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding minors could be prosecuted
for statutory rape in relation to consensual sex and that “[t]he crux of the state’s interest in
the minor-to-minor situation is in protecting the minor from the sexual activity itself for
reasons of health and quality of life”); In re Pima Cty. Juvenile Appeal No. 74802-2, 790
P.2d at 729 (“We are persuaded that the state has a significant interest in proscribing sexual
conduct between minors.”); In re Hildebrant, 548 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that prosecution of fourteen-year-old girl for conventionally consensual sex with
her thirteen-year-old adopted brother did not violate the policy behind the statutory rapetype statute, which “has its basis in the presumption that the children’s immaturity and
innocence prevents them from appreciating the full magnitude and consequences of their
conduct”); In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding the purpose of the
statutory rape statute was “to protect children . . . from the consequences of premature
sexual experiences”); Cote H. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 175 P.3d 906, 909 (Nev. 2008)
(finding that liberally construing statutory rape statute to permit minors under the age of
consent to be adjudicated delinquent is consistent with that statute’s purpose “to protect
minors from others’ lewd acts”); In re P.M., 592 A.2d 862, 863 (Vt. 1991) (declining to
read a minimum age limit for perpetrators into the statutory rape law). A legal age of
consent may be intended to serve an aspirational or morally-prescriptive function, sending
a message that sexual activity among juveniles below a certain age is not socially
acceptable. Kadish, supra note 72, at 914 (“[O]ne of [the] central purposes [of criminal
law is] as a solidifier and communalizer of moral values.”). This function could equally be
served by fornication laws that criminalize all consensual sex among minors. The question
of whether this is an appropriate function of criminal and juvenile law is beyond the scope
of this article—although I take the position that potentially harmful sex among minors that
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3. Prosecutorial Discretion Is Not an Adequate Means
of Confining Statutory Rape to Wrongful Adolescent
Sex
Cases involving statutory rape proceedings in relation to
sex among conventionally consenting, similarly situated minors
appear to be rare, although at least one court has said that
statutory rape laws can be used against both minors for
consensual sex “on the basis that each is a victim of the other.” 78
More commonly, and given the prevalence of sexual activity
among American teenagers below the age of consent, 79
prosecutorial discretion is exercised to exclude sexual activity
among adolescents from the reach of legal regulation unless it
appears to be exploitative. 80 However, there are numerous
does not involve exploitation is best addressed with non-criminal policies or diversion
programs, rather than by criminalizing fornication among adolescents, for at least two
practical reasons. First, there is the difficulty of enforcing fornication laws uniformly (due
to the sheer number of adolescents who are sexually active) and fairly. See supra note 38;
supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text; Kadish, supra note 72, at 911-13 (discussing the
potential for “arbitrary and abusive law enforcement” where legislation prohibits
consensual extramarital sexual behavior). Second, there is the difficulty in defining a cutoff age at which juvenile privacy and autonomy interests should be trumped by the state’s
interest in proscribing a moral standard and protecting juveniles from the harms of
premature sexual activity. See generally B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995) (finding
application of statutory rape law to sixteen-year-old for consensual sex with another
sixteen-year-old was unconstitutional under constitutional right of privacy); Flynn, supra
note 40, at 697 (“Since society has come to acknowledge the fact that teenagers engage in
sexual activity, the punishment of such activity becomes not only moot, but also contrary
to societal interests.”); Fischel, supra note 25, at 300 (“Criminalizing sexual activity among
minors condemns sex, not coercion; dampens the sexual autonomy of young people; and
disrespects their choices. If many or most young people are first having sex while below
the age of consent, our social and legal obligation is not to penalize the sex—making it
more difficult for teenagers to report coercion—but to protect young people’s choices,
desires, and safety. We fail this obligation if we criminalize teenagers for having sex.”).
For a discussion on the constitutionality of using fornication statutes to regulate teenage
sex, see generally Martin R. Gardner, The Categorical Distinction Between Adolescents
and Adults: The Supreme Court’s Juvenile Punishment Cases—Constitutional Implications
for Regulating Teenage Sexual Activity, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2013); Loewy, supra note
47.
78. In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d at 635; see also Michael F. Caldwell, What We Do Not
Know About Juvenile Sexual Reoffense Risk, 7 CHILD MALTREATMENT 291, 292 (2002)
(noting that “adjudication of noncoerced peer teen sexual activity is apparently not
widespread” but “is fairly common in at least one state [Wisconsin]”).
79. See supra notes 37-38.
80. Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 12, at 750-51 (noting “an apparent
consensus among prosecutors against enforcement of statutory rape laws in cases of
‘consensual sexual relationships’ among peers” and concluding that “statutory rape laws
currently are enforced at the margins, rather than in the main. The bulk of the statutory
rape docket consists of cases in which society is likely to view the predator as ‘sick,’ rather
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problems with relying on prosecutorial discretion alone to so
confine the scope of statutory rape laws. First, the Z.C. case and
others show that prosecutorial discretion is not a fail-proof
safeguard. 81 Second, even laws that are enforced infrequently
may be used as threats against juveniles. 82 Third, the lack of
clarity as to whether consensual sex among minors is a proper
target of statutory rape laws produces uncertainty for both
minors 83 and mandatory reporters, 84 and may produce a chilling

than simply lovelorn, and cases that arguably could be tried as forcible rape”); Phipps,
supra note 39, at 401 n.170 (“If there is no evidence of coercion or other wrongful conduct,
prosecutors simply do not have the resources (or the inclination) to prosecute these cases
[involving voluntary sex between teenagers].”); In re Pima Cty. Juvenile Appeal No.
74802-2, 790 P.2d at 727 (“[T]he state conceded in oral argument that it does not attempt
to apply § 13-1404 [prohibiting sexual contact with a person under fifteen years of age] to
all juveniles who violate it, nor does it intend to.”); Gail Ryan, Sexually Abusive Youth:
Defining the Problem and the Population, in JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTION 3, 4 (2d ed. 1997) (“In most cases, activities with
willing similar-aged peers were only charged as ‘statutory’ crimes if a complaint was
made.”); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306 (Vt. 2000) (noting that the state’s attorney
“receives numerous complaints to prosecute teenagers under [statutory rape provision],
usually from parents, but does so only when there is evidence of coercion or a lack of true
consent”); Sandy Nowack, A Community Prosecution Approach to Statutory Rape:
Wisconsin’s Pilot Policy Project, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 865, 873-75 (2001); Kay L. Levine,
The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory
Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 695 (2006).
81. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1212 n.9 (Utah 2007) (“The primary fail-safe
against the absurd application of criminal law is the wise employment of prosecutorial
discretion, a quality that is starkly absent in this case.”); see also In re B.A.M., 806 A.2d
893, 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (finding application of a “deliberately protective [statutory
rape statute] specifically intended by the Legislature to shield young children from sexual
predation by older teenagers and adults” to eleven-year-old for sex with another elevenyear-old produced an absurd result); Megan Twohey, Teens Who Have Sex Charged With
Abuse: DAs Prosecuting Even When Both Consent, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 8,
2004, at 1A; Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Teens Have Right to Have Sex, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2003, at 1B (reporting proceedings against two fourteen-year-old
juveniles for attempted sexual assault, following the girl’s mother finding the pair in bed
about to have sexual intercourse). For a fascinating socio-legal study of how prosecutors in
California individually and collectively develop standards to define the meaning of
exploitation in the statutory rape caseload, see Levine, supra note 80, at 713-32.
82. Oliveri, supra note 14, at 505.
83. Meiners-Levy, supra note 46, at 512 (arguing that given society’s acceptance of
preteen and teenage sex, “there is little reason for a teenager to believe that sexual contact
can lead to prosecution absent specific familiarity with the law”).
84. In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 306; see also Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal. v.
Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 275, 280 (1986) (commenting dicta that it is
“illogical” to definitively apply child abuse statute to voluntary sexual conduct among
minors under the specified age limit and finding that reporting of voluntary non-abusive
behavior of sexually active minors violates right to sexual privacy guaranteed mature
minors by California Constitution).
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effect in terms of teens’ willingness to seek guidance about
relationships, pregnancy, sexual health and child support from
their elders. 85 Fourth, Professor Levine points out that to the
extent that prosecutors attempt to use statutory rape laws
sparingly—to target only cases involving exploitation—this
insulates the law’s technical condemnation of all sex involving
minors, including non-abusive and meaningfully consensual sex
among members of the protected class, from “meaningful public
critique.” 86
Finally, a criminal code that theoretically allows for the
punishment of consensual sex between minors as statutory rape,
but relies on prosecutorial discretion to ensure sex per se is not
the punitive target, can too easily lead to selective punishment of
juvenile fornication as statutory rape based on prosecutorial
judgments about when consensual, non-abusive sex is morally
unworthy. 87 Not only is “bad sex” not the appropriate target of
statutory rape laws, but this also raises equal protection issues
for juveniles whose sexuality lies outside the “charmed circle”
of “normal, natural, blessed” sexuality 88—for example,
adolescents in institutional settings 89 or non-heterosexual
youth 90—and may accordingly be disproportionately targeted. 91
85. Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 12, at 743 (arguing that “it is the height
of foolishness to deter a teen from seeking contraception, treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases, prenatal care, or food for their infant”).
86. Levine, supra note 80, at 744-45.
87. See Kadish, supra note 72.
88. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
89. ZIMRING, supra note 71, at 54 (noting that “consensual ‘status offenders’ are
seldom prosecuted except in institutional settings such as group homes – a double standard
with potentially lifelong legal consequences); Meiners-Levy, supra note 46, at 502 n.2
(“The children most likely to be targeted in prosecutions for consensual sexual encounters
that violate the law because of the age of both the victim and the ‘perpetrator’ are children
already involved in the juvenile justice or child welfare systems.”).
90. For discussion of bias against homosexual youths in Romeo and Juliet
exceptions and statutory rape enforcement generally, see COCCA, supra note 3, at 10
(noting that there is “some evidence that prosecutions under the [statutory rape] laws have
disproportionately targeted homosexual relationships”); Michael H. Meidinger, Note,
Peeking Under the Covers: Taking a Closer Look at Prosecutorial Decision-Making
Involving Queer Youth and Statutory Rape, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 421 (2012) (arguing
that queer youth may be more vulnerable to statutory rape prosecutions based on their
“failure to fit social norms”); Caitlyn Silhan, Comment, The Present Case Does Involve
Minors: An Overview of the Discriminatory Effects of Romeo and Juliet Provisions and
Sentencing Practices on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 20 LAW &
SEXUALITY 97, 109 (2011); Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The
Cruel and Invidious Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 195 (2008) (discussing statutory rape schemes that limit Romeo and Juliet
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B. Use of Statutory Rape Laws to Target Undefined
Victimization (Wrongful Sex) Within the Protected
Class Is Unduly Subjective
The Z.C. court limited its holding to “situations where no
true victim or perpetrator can be identified.” 92 This points to the
more common use of statutory rape laws against members of the
protected class: one-sided prosecution of the “true offender.”
Sex among minors may involve predatory power dynamics
or outright exploitation and abuse. 93 As sexual creatures,
juveniles are capable of exploiting the relative vulnerability of
others for their own sexual gratification. 94 Studies have shown
that some child molesters begin abusing children as juveniles.95
It is obviously important that the law responds to the grave harm
inflicted on children who are sexually abused whether by adults
or by other minors, 96 and to intervene with rehabilitative
measures when a juvenile shows such predatory proclivities. 97
Even sex among adolescents that at first glance appears to be
conventionally consensual may on closer examination involve
elements of undue persuasion or emotional manipulation. 98 As

exceptions to heterosexual conduct); Sutherland, supra note 19, at 327-28; Commonwealth
v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010) (seeking discovery to prove selective
enforcement of statutory rape laws based on sexual orientation); Fischel, supra note 25, at
301 (arguing that “insofar as age of consent statutes are and have been disproportionately
enforced against black men and gay men, criminal law in the areas of sexual proscriptions
and sentencing is more plausibly rendered as a conduit and codification of racism and
homophobia”).
91. See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
92. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Utah 2007); see also Commonwealth v.
Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (clarifying that the holding in In re B.A.M.,
if worded more precisely, “would have strictly [been] limited . . . to its facts wherein
mutually agreed upon sexual activity between peers under the age of 13 is not a crime”).
93. Gail Ryan, Sexually Abusive Youth: Defining the Population, in JUVENILE
SEXUAL OFFENDING: CAUSES CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTION 3-5 (Gail Ryan &
Sandy Lane eds., 2d ed. 1997).
94. Id. at 4-7; GIBSON & VANDIVER, supra note 74, at 80-82.
95. Gail Ryan, The Evolving Response to Juvenile Sexual Offenses, in JUVENILE
SEXUAL OFFENDING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTION 180 (Gail Ryan &
Sandy Lane eds., 2d ed. 1997).
96. P.G. v. State, 616 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (“Children are entitled
to no less protection from other children who sexually abuse them than they are from adults
who sexually abuse them.”).
97. But see Ryan, supra note 95, at 180 (“Until recent years, juveniles engaging in
behaviors that were clearly both sexual and criminal were often dismissed with a ‘boys will
be boys’ attitude or a slap on the hand by parents, teachers, and judges alike.”).
98. See Oberman, supra note 73, at 70.
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discussed above, such exploitative sex is properly considered
wrongful or morally impermissible, as distinct from merely bad
or morally unworthy. 99
B.A.H. was fourteen when his male cousin and best friend,
thirteen-year-old X.X., slept over. 100 The boys consumed
alcohol at B.A.H.’s urging, and B.A.H. initiated a sexual
encounter involving oral and anal intercourse. 101 Some time
after X.X. told him to stop, B.A.H. stopped. 102 He told X.X. he
would kill him if he told anyone about what had happened,
which X.X. took to be “more like an exaggeration” based on
B.A.H.’s fear of being outed as “bi.” 103 Some months later
when X.X. told his mother about the encounter, she took him to
a counselor, a mandated reporter, who disclosed the allegations
to the police. 104 B.A.H. was charged with statutory rape. 105
Both B.A.H. and X.X. were under the relevant age of consent,
which was sixteen years. 106
Many features of the encounter between B.A.H. and X.X.
are troubling. B.A.H. was an (admittedly only slightly) older
cousin of X.X., which may have influenced the power dynamics
of their relationship—X.X. said that he “did not want to [do it]”
but that [B.A.H.] convinced him “because [B.A.H.] [was]
[X.X.’s] favorite cousin” and X.X. “didn’t want to feel like . . .
being mean.” 107 In addition, B.A.H. supplied the alcohol that
likely impacted the judgment, capacity, and inhibitions of both
the boys; failed to stop at X.X.’s command; and threatened X.X.
after the fact. 108 Even on the brevity of facts found in the
judgment, a reasonable observer might infer victimization of
X.X. by B.A.H.; that this was not “just sex,” but sex that crossed
the line from fornication to abuse. Indeed, the court found that
99. See Martinson, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
100. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn. 2014).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d at 161; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West 2016)
(“A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person . . . is guilty of criminal
sexual conduct in the first degree if . . . the actor has a significant relationship to the
complainant and the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual
penetration . . . . [C]onsent to the act by the complainant is [not] a defense.”).
106. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342(b) (West 2016).
107. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn. 2014).
108. Id.
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the encounter between B.A.H. and X.X. reflected “an almost
archetypal perpetrator and victim of criminal sexual conduct,”
and upheld B.A.H.’s delinquency adjudication. 109 Nonetheless,
there are serious problems with applying strict liability statutory
rape laws to sexual contact between members of the same
protected class, even in cases like that of B.A.H. where the
intended punitive target is wrongful exploitation of a minor by a
minor.

1. The Punitive Target Is Not Defined
The objectionable conduct as defined by a statutory rape
statute is sex with a minor. 110 When an adult has sex with a
minor, the adult alone has engaged in the prohibited conduct and
the minor is deemed a victim. 111 When two minors engage in
sexual contact, each has satisfied the elements of statutory rape
and each is legally a violator, whether or not there was de facto
exploitation or harm. 112 In cases like B.A.H., prosecutorial
discretion is exercised to target victimization of the “true”
victim by the “true” offender and the statute is enforced
accordingly. 113 The difficulty with this approach is that it is
vague and subjective, because in the context of sex among
members of the protected class, victimhood is not defined.
109. Id. at 166.
110. 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 13 (2001) (“The elements of statutory rape are merely
sexual intercourse with a person under the statutory age of consent.”).
111. There may be cases of adult-minor sexual contact where the minor, deemed by
statutory rape law to be a victim, is in fact the “true offender” vis-à-vis the separate offense
of forcible rape. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, The Paradox of
Statutory Rape, 87 IND. L.J. 505 (2012) (discussing how an adult rape victim, raped by a
sexually aggressive minor below the age of consent, is exposed to statutory rape liability).
112. The State in B.A.H. conceded that both boys were similarly situated in relation
to the statute. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d at 165. This would not be true in a case where
one minor was a completely passive participant, due to the absence of a voluntary act.
113. The court found the decision to charge B.A.H. and not X.X. was rational
because the encounter between B.A.H. and X.X. reflected “an almost archetypal
perpetrator and victim of criminal sexual conduct.” Id. at 166. See also id. at 167 (Page,
J., concurring) (“[The argument that X.X. also committed criminal sexual conduct] cannot
go unchallenged because it harkens back to a day when sexual assault victims were
considered as culpable as the perpetrators of such assaults.”); State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d
1206, 1213 (Utah 2007) (finding that statutory rape law as applied to thirteen-year-old
female juvenile who engaged in “mutually welcome” sexual intercourse with twelve-yearold boy, produced absurd result not intended by legislature, but confining holding to
“situations where no true victim or perpetrator can be identified”); In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d
528, 533 (Ohio 2011) (noting “the temptation for prosecutors to label one child as the
offender and the other child as the victim” in relation to sex within the protected class).
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Instead, it is left to prosecutors to define the punitive target of
statutory rape laws as applied to sex among minors, be it
nonconsensual sex, coercion, incest, loss of virginity,
impregnation, fornication, or some other notion of bad or
wrongful sex. Accordingly, prosecutorial beliefs about the
normative boundary between good, bad and wrongful sex can
significantly influence the regulation of sex among adolescents
and whose conduct is legally sanctioned. 114 Phipps gives the
following illustration:
[O]ne county prosecutor may believe that all voluntary
sex between teenagers is wrong and vigorously
prosecute all cases brought to her attention. A
prosecutor in an adjoining county, however, might
create a per se rule that any time a victim says “no,”
such cases are always prosecuted. And yet another
county prosecutor may decide to prosecute only cases
in which the female makes a prompt outcry and
immediately tells a third party that sex was coerced.
Thus, rather than deciding which offense to apply to
114. Kadish, supra note 72, at 909-11 (cited in In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306-07 (Vt.
2000).
[S]tatutes which seem deliberately to over-criminalize, in the sense of
encompassing conduct not the target of legislative concern . . . are in
effect equivalent to enactments of a broad legislative policy against, for
example, undesirable gambling, leaving it to the police to further that
policy by such arrests as seem to them compatible with it. From one
point of view such statutes invite a danger cognate to that of defining a
crime by analogy, augmented by the fact that it is the policeman who is
defining criminal conduct rather than a court. That no actual abuse has
been demonstrated in police administration of an overdrawn statute,
such as gambling, would not seem to answer the moral and precedential
objections to this tactic . . . .
Id.; Michelle Oberman, Two Truths and a Lie: In re John Z. and Other Stories at the
Juncture of Teen Sex and the Law, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 364, 395 (2013) (“[D]istrict
attorneys’ offices serve as factories in which the criminal law meets the reality of limited
resources and the ‘real’ crimes become articulated.”); In re P.M., 592 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt.
1991) (Dooley, J., dissenting) (arguing that whether behavior contravenes a statutory rape
provision should turn on “the type of conduct involved, not on an ad hoc balancing of the
relative positions of the parties or on indicia of some unspecified level of exploitation”);
Phipps, supra note 39, at 417 (arguing in relation to statutory rape provisions that “[i]f
something other than the act of sexual intercourse is the objectionable conduct (e.g., use of
coercion), then that conduct must be defined . . . [or the] crime becomes pliable and everchanging”); Oliveri, supra note 14, at 503-04 (discussing the risk of statutory rape laws
being used “as a vehicle for a particular prosecutor’s political or social agenda,” and giving
examples of the use of anti-fornication and cohabitation laws to target welfare recipients
and welfare fraud).
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given conduct, the prosecutor would be . . . defining
crimes on a case-by-case basis rather than on the basis
of objective criteria established by a state legislature.115

Thus, even assuming good-faith efforts are made to exclude
mere fornication from the scope of statutory rape laws as applied
to minor defendants, the true crime of “victimization” or
“exploitation” is not defined. In other words, as applied to
minor-minor sex, statutory rape statutes are so over-inclusive
that it is left to prosecutors to define the scope of illegal minorminor exploitation.116 Should pregnancy always be considered
to constitute victimization of a female by a male? 117 What about
when a parent complains about their child’s loss of chastity, or
involvement with a same-sex peer? 118 Such a flexible approach
to minor-minor sex is objectionable as a matter of policy,
because the question of how society should respond to
adolescent sexuality, and the proper limits of law’s tolerance
thereof, is a complex and controversial policy matter that should
not be left to prosecutorial predilection but should be
confronted, as far as possible, with statutory clarity. 119
115. Phipps, supra note 39, at 413.
116. Id.
117. COCCA, supra note 3, at 9-10 (“[I]n cases in which a female becomes pregnant,
she is assumed to be the victim.”); see id. at 26, 93-128 (discussing the historical use of
statutory rape laws “to target men for the impregnation of young impoverished women”);
Oliveri, supra note 14, at 493; Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal
Law: In Search of Reason, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 119 (1997) (arguing that the
selective use of statutory rape to target pregnancy “risks overlooking the harm caused to
the many children who do not become pregnant, as well as overlooking all harm to boys
and pre-pubescent girls”).
118. Oberman, supra note 114, at 378 n.33 (noting that in cases involving two
minors, “practically speaking, the law distinguishes victim from perpetrator by virtue of
reporting: The victim is the one whose parents first complain to the police.”); Sutherland,
supra note 19, at 322 (noting that statutory rape cases involving consensual sex among
teenagers “are usually brought to the attention of the criminal justice system by parents or
by welfare officials”).
119. A similar criticism can be made in relation to cases of adult-minor statutory
rape and the use of prosecutorial discretion to refrain from prosecuting cases that appear to
involve conventionally consensual sex. This discretionary approach to statutory rape
enforcement generally is not without its controversy. Sutherland, supra note 19, at 332
(noting it depends on an “operative definition of ‘consensual’ [that] may allow for
considerable violence and coercion. The implicit message is that the consent of certain
girls to certain boys is presumed on the basis of class and racial stereotypes”). However,
this is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Master’s House, supra note 27
(discussing juvenile sexual activity and statutory rape laws in today’s society). Cf. Phipps,
supra note 39 (analyzing and responding to various articles written by Oberman regarding
the regulation of minors’ sexual activity).
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2. Undefined Punitive Target May Lead to
Discriminatory Prosecutions of Unpopular Minors and
Over-Criminalization
This vagueness 120 also raises equal protection and fairness
concerns, in that factors such as gender, sexual orientation, race,
economic
class,
social
background,
parental
involvement/complaints, and prior sexual experience may
improperly influence enforcement decisions due to assumptions
about what type of sex is harmful, who is harmed by sex, and
who is an aggressor. 121 Those assumptions “will not always be
borne out by the facts,” 122 and could potentially reflect bias, for
example, against boys, gay or queer youth, previously unchaste
minors, or interracial couples. 123
120. I am not making a due process void-for-vagueness argument; I am in agreement
with courts that have found statutory rape laws define the legally prohibited conduct
clearly, even as applied to sex among minors. See, e.g., In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158,
164 (Minn. 2014); L.L.N. v. State, 504 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); In re John C.,
569 A.2d 1154, 1157 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); cf. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ohio
2011) (holding that a statutory rape provision, as applied to a child under the age of
consent, is unconstitutionally vague). Rather, my argument is that as far as they can be
applied to members of the protected class, the use of statutory rape laws to target the
true/factual victim is premised on a vague and subjective notion of victimhood, which
raises policy and equal protection concerns.
121. Phipps, supra note 39, at 413 (arguing that “[a]n obvious implication of such
overly broad discretion is that it would unnecessarily open the door to improper
considerations in the charging decision.”).
122. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1995).
123. See, e.g., Sutherland, supra note 19, at 332-36 (discussing how factors such as
gender, class, race and sexual orientation impact social tolerance for adolescent sexuality
and the enforcement patterns of statutory rape laws); ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE
173 (2001) (“[A]ssumptions concerning the sexual aggressiveness of men and the sexual
passivity of women.”); B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d at 261 (Kogan, J., concurring)
(“Attempting to brand one as the aggressor and the other as the victim raises very serious
questions of equal protection, especially where prosecutors always assume that one type of
child—such as ‘the boy,’ or the one who is ‘unchaste’—must be the aggressor . . . some
children—even boys—fall into a tragic cycle of sexual exploitation by others, which robs
them of virginity but certainly does not indicate they are aggressors. And I am utterly
unwilling to say that repeat victims of sexual exploitation must be considered aggressors
merely because of prior victimization by third parties.”); Gammons v. Berlat, 696 P.2d 700
(Ariz. 1985) (finding thirteen-year-old boy, but not consenting fifteen-year-old female
partner, subject to criminal statutory rape proceedings, when both under age of consent);
Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 376-79 (2006)
(discussing evidence of bias against male perpetrators in statutory rape cases generally);
Oberman, supra note 114, at 382 (arguing that “the two-dimensional script rendering all
boys predators cannot be any more accurate than the script that divides girls into virgins
and whores”); Goodwin, supra note 46, at 530-31 (noting evidence of bias against black
males in statutory rape cases generally); Higdon, supra note 90, at 224 (discussing the use
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Moreover, because statutory rape is a strict liability offense,
if a prosecutor designates a minor the “true offender” based on
perceived victimization, such as in the case of B.A.H., it does
not need to prove that the sex was in fact abusive, coercive, or
otherwise harmful. 124 Accordingly, the minor is not given an
opportunity to answer the implied but undefined charge of
victimization, even in the face of severe potential lifelong
penalties and stigma that can follow a statutory rape conviction
or adjudication. This could result in mere fornicators being
unfairly labeled child abusers, an over-criminalization problem
that, as discussed above, arguably dilutes the moral authority of
statutory rape laws and produces unjust consequences for
minors. 125

3. G.T. v. Vermont
The Supreme Court of Vermont pointed to these problems
in the case of G.T. v. Vermont, which involved a similar fact
pattern to B.A.H., 126 in holding that Vermont’s statutory rape
law could not be applied to members of the protected class. 127
The G.T. court criticized the prosecutor’s approach, which is
reportedly common, 128 of bringing statutory rape proceedings
against a juvenile only when it believes the juvenile has
committed rape. This approach ensures the prosecutor:
[D]oes not have to prove the presence of the exact
elements it found to justify the prosecution. Thus, the
prosecutor determines what crime the juvenile has
committed, but charges in such a way as to ensure that
the juvenile never has the opportunity to show that he
or she did not commit the crime found by the
prosecutor . . . [T]he selective enforcement of the
underlying statute has the hallmarks that other courts
have relied upon to find discriminatory prosecution. 129

of statutory rape laws to marginalize and stigmatize LGBT teens); Fischel, supra note 25,
at 301.
124. United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2013).
125. See supra Part III.A.2.
126. See infra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
127. In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 309 (Vt. 2000).
128. See supra note 80.
129. In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 306.
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Consider a hypothetical: Ellis, aged twelve and Riley, aged
eleven (four months younger than Ellis) have sex at Riley’s
suggestion. 130 Riley has been socialized to believe it is normal
and acceptable to try to persuade someone to “give out.” Ellis
was hesitant at first but eventually acquiesced, because Ellis has
been socialized to believe that failure to do so will lead to social
stigma and exclusion. 131 Riley has already been sexually active
with other peers, partly in an attempt to mask the pain of being
sexually molested as a young child; 132 Ellis was a virgin. Ellis
contracts a sexually transmitted disease from Riley, and the
parents get involved. Ellis’ parents insist that their child would
never willingly have sex at such a young age, and press for
statutory rape proceedings to be brought against Riley.
Is there a victim-offender binary here that warrants a
finding of abuse, or is this mere fornication, albeit troubling in
terms of the children’s young age and the harmful sexual health
outcome? There are no easy answers or bright lines when it
comes to the “murky middle” between healthy and normal
(consensual, safe, mature) juvenile sex and outright rape. But in
relation to a strict liability sex abuse statute that defines the
objectionable conduct as sex with a minor (as opposed to, say,
coercion, transmission of disease, impregnation or sex with a
130. Consensual sexual activity is rare but not non-existent among ten, eleven and
twelve-year-olds. Finer & Philbin, supra note 36, 888 (reporting that 3.7% of American
children have had sex by their thirteenth birthdays, although noting that sex in this age
bracket is more likely to be nonconsensual).
131. On the impact of socialization on juvenile sexual behavior, see generally
Oberman, supra note 73, at 55; Stodghill, supra note 14 (reporting a Rhode Island study of
1700 sixth- and ninth-graders that found 65% of boys and 57% of girls believe it is
acceptable for a male to force a female to have sex if they’ve been dating for six months);
CAHILL, supra note 123, at 185 (arguing that “the social structure imposed upon sexual
interactions demands that girls . . . fend off the advances of sexually aggressive boys . . .
who are in turn responding to social demands to enact such aggressive roles”); Master’s
House, supra note 27, at 820; Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 12, 713-17 (arguing
that “[t]he combination of girls’ age-appropriate naivet[é] and insecurity and the norms of
male sexual initiative make bad bargains inevitable” in regards to the problem of nonvoluntary sex among teenagers).
132. See generally Gail Ryan, Theories of Etiology, in JUVENILE SEXUAL
OFFENDING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTIONS 19, 25-26 (Gail Ryan & Sandy
Lane eds., 2d ed. 1997) (noting that sexual victimization and exploitation may result in
deviant sexual behavior in juveniles); B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 261 (Fla. 1995)
(noting the victim-victimizer cycle); ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 13, at 113 (noting that
“many juvenile offenders have experienced both physical and sexual abuse during
childhood and adolescence” and arguing that many juvenile sexual offenders are “children
at risk” rather than “risky children”).
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previously chaste minor), Ellis and Riley are similarly situated:
each is legally a violator and each is supposed to be protected by
statutory rape laws. Prosecutors seeking to target problematic
minor-minor sex using statutory rape laws are left to define
factual/true victimization in relation to sex within the protected
class as they see fit. As Justice Dooley noted in his dissent in
P.M.:
When a prosecutor, a trial court, and ultimately a
majority of the members of this Court find the age
differential between the participants sufficient or find
the presence of “exploitation” (without defining that
concept)—in short, when their sensibilities are
sufficiently offended by the conduct—they are willing
to find delinquency, but otherwise not. This is far too
amorphous a standard on which to ground an
adjudication of juvenile delinquency. 133

In short, where statutory rape provisions that are broad
enough to encompass victimless minor-minor sex are used to
target perceived victimization among minors, the definition of
133. In re P.M., 592 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 1991); see also In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528,
533-34 (Ohio 2011) (holding that a statutory rape provision, as applied to a child under age
thirteen who engaged in sexual contact with another child under age thirteen, is
unconstitutionally vague and violates equal protection as each child is a member of the
class protected by the statute); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 309 (Vt. 2000) (construing
statutory rape statute narrowly so as to be inapplicable where alleged perpetrator is also
victim under age of consent; to construe broadly would be inconsistent with legislative
policy, raise possibility of discriminatory enforcement, and implicate constitutional privacy
concerns); cf. State v. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that
decision by a prosecutor to charge only some offenders, where all were below the age of
consent, is not a ground for a claim of denial of equal protection, because prosecutorial
discretion can be exercised to determine relative culpability where there are multiple
violators); In re Hawley, 606 N.W.2d 50, 52-53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that
decision to charge fifteen-year-old male but not twelve-year-old female for same act of
consensual sex, when each was under age of consent, did not violate equal protection
because individuals were not similarly situated in view of the greater protection afforded
by legislature to younger individuals); In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 165-66 (Minn. 2014)
(finding the State’s decision to charge fourteen-year-old minor but not his consenting
thirteen-year-old partner with statutory rape, when both below age of consent, was rational
and did not violate his constitutional rights to equal protection); In re T.A.J., 62 Cal. App.
4th 1350, 1361 (1998) (holding that statutory rape statute may be constitutionally applied
to member of the protected class; question of when, who, and under what circumstances
minors should be charged under statutory rape law must reside within sound exercise of
prosecutorial discretion); In re T.C., 214 P.3d 1082, 1098 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (finding
that twelve-year-old minor who had non-forcible sexual contact with seven-year-old child
[where the age of consent is fourteen] failed to show that filing of petition against him, but
not two other alleged participants, was based on arbitrary classification).
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victimization and the indicia of victimhood are left to
prosecutorial discretion and the law is inherently vague and
pliable. 134
Given the complexity of the policy issues
surrounding adolescent sexuality, the contested and evolving
normative boundary between “good,” “bad” and “wrongful”
adolescent sex, and the potential for discriminatory prosecutions
of unpopular minors that subvert the purported
gender/orientation/race/chastity/class-neutrality of statutory rape
laws, greater statutory clarity is required. Policy decisions about
when and how to use sex abuse laws against the class that has
been deemed in need of protection should be clearly legislated.
Otherwise, there is a risk of unfairly presuming victimization
and legally creating a victim-offender binary through selective
prosecution, when in fact the sex was not abusive. 135 This is
concerning as a matter of equal protection, and also as a matter
of policy for the potential to treat mere fornicators as abusers,
possibly subject to registration as sex offenders, but without a
right of reply. 136 In this way, a law designed as a shield for
minors may utterly fail to protect its intended protected class
from injustice and discrimination.

134. Phipps, supra note 39, at 417-18; Kay L. Levine, The External Evolution of
Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2008) (“[W]here the formal language of
the statute is broad and there is no stable consensus as to the harm caused by the prohibited
behavior, variation in enforcement over time is likely to thrive.”).
135. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1213, n.10 (Utah 2007) (warning against
“creat[ion] [of] a perpetrator and a victim through selective prosecution”). Similar
arguments have been raised in relation to the selective enforcement of statutory rape
against adult defendants. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Statutory Rape Laws: Does it Make
Sense to Enforce Them in an Increasingly Permissive Society?, 82 A.B.A. J. 86, 87 (1996)
(arguing that statutory rape laws cannot be enforced uniformly, and that enforcement
patterns are influenced by class and race, thereby “providing a weapon against men from
social groups we do not like”). Although in cases of adult-minor sex, there is only one
legal violator, and it cannot be said that the law is being used as a sword against one it was
designed to shield.
136. The issue of overbroad prosecutorial discretion, resulting in inconsistent and
arguably unfair prosecutions of minors in the absence of factual victimization or abusive
conduct, also arises in the related context of “sexting” and child pornography charges. See,
e.g., Joanne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?,
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 988-90 (2011); Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting:
Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers’ Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 570-73 (2010); Wood, supra note 64, at 170-71. But see Mary
Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Response to
Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 39 (2007) (arguing
“sexting” constitutes “self-exploitation” to which prosecution is an appropriate response).
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IV. REFORMULATING THE LEGAL AND POLICY
RESPONSE TO SEX AMONG MINORS
Cases like B.A.H. illustrate that adolescent sex often takes
place in “the gray area between consent and coercion.” 137 The
legal response to sex among minors should account, as far as
possible, for the lack of bright lines distinguishing morally
permissible sex from morally impermissible sex, consent from
coercion, and normal sexual exploration and experimentation
from sexual exploitation; 138 and the spectrum from childhood
vulnerability and immaturity to adulthood competence and
autonomy. 139
This lack of bright lines has been used in defense of a
statutory scheme that prohibits all sex, consensual or otherwise,
among minors and leaves it to prosecutors to determine which
cases of minor-minor sex, where both minors are technical
violators, involve sanctionable victimization by a “true”
offender. 140 Prosecutorial discretion is certainly one answer to
the complexity of adolescent sexuality, but I have argued herein
that the risks of over-criminalization and subjective,
discriminatory and inconsistent enforcement are too high, and
137. Oliveri, supra note 14, at 485; see also Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A
Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 427 (1984) (arguing that “these
two categories [equal consensual sexual intercourse on one hand, and bad, coercive sex
imposed upon a female by a male aggressor on the other hand] constitute a continuum of
sexual relations; there is no bright line between them”).
138. Martinson, supra note 13, at 51, 53 (noting “a marked trend toward greater
heterosexual experience of preadolescents with their peers in the United States . . . children
continue to engage in both autoerotic behaviors and sexual interactions with peers
throughout childhood . . . it is apparent that children have always been sexual and continue
to be sexual”); GIBSON & VANDIVER, supra note 74, at vii (noting that “much of the
juvenile activities tagged as ‘sex offending’ are no more than fairly innocent
developmental exploratory sexual activity”). But see Finer & Philbin, supra note 36, at
890 (noting that “sexual activity among the youngest adolescents is frequently of a
different nature than that of middle and older teens, in that it is frequently nonconsensual”).
139. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
140. See Master’s House, supra note 27, at 825; Regulating Consensual Sex, supra
note 12, at 729-30; see, e.g., In re T.A.J., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (Cal. App. Ct. 1998)
(holding that statutory rape statute may be constitutionally applied to member of the
protected class; question of when, who, and under what circumstances minors should be
charged under statutory rape law must reside within sound exercise of prosecutorial
discretion); In re T.C., 214 P.3d 1082, 1097 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that “the
legislative intent was to maintain the . . . prohibition on [consensual sexual conduct
between members of the protected class] and to rely on . . . the proper exercise of
prosecutorial and judicial discretion, to avoid criminalizing or unjustly penalizing sexual
activities between children”).
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the consequences thereof for individual minors are grave. 141
Prosecutorial discretion “cannot be accepted as a substitute for a
sufficient law.” 142 To better shield purported “true offenders”
from unjust or discriminatory proceedings under the very laws
designed for their protection, the use of statutory rape laws
against minors should be predicated on a clear and objective
definition of the punitive target of such laws. 143 At the same
time, sexual assault laws generally should be strengthened to
more adequately respond to cases of coercion and nonconsent
among minors and to better ensure the protection of true
victims. 144 Finally, sexual assault laws may need to be
supplemented by other policy measures designed to target “bad”
but not necessarily “wrongful” sex among minors. 145 I discuss
each in turn.

A. Clarifying the Punitive Target of Statutory Rape
Law
There are many possible outcome-based indicia that could
be used to clearly define and identify impermissible
victimization in the context of sex among minors—for example,
pregnancy, 146 transmission of disease, loss of chastity, or severe
emotional disturbance. However, just because a minor-minor
sexual encounter leads to a harmful outcome for one or both of
the minors, this does not mean the sex was necessarily
exploitative. 147 There is an important distinction between “A’s
act harms B” and “A’s act exploits B.” 148 And as discussed in
Part III, there are strong reasons of principle and policy for
confining the use of statutory rape laws, with their weighty
141. See supra Part III.A and Part III.B.
142. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1097, 1102 (1952).
143. Phipps, supra note 39, at 413.
144. Id. at 427-40.
145. Id. at 439.
146. Defining pregnancy as exploitation is controversial, as it would arguably embed
and propagate the idea that pregnancy is a harm done to girls by boys, denying both the
sexual agency of girls and the parental responsibility of boys. Even if in practice the
burden of child-rearing falls squarely on teen mothers rather than teen fathers. See Michael
M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1981) (criminalizing impregnation
of a minor by another minor will do little to remedy that social injustice); Oliveri, supra
note 14, at 492-96.
147. See infra Part IV.A.1.
148. WERTHEIMER, supra note10, at 96.

822

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:787

stigma, lifelong consequences and moral gravity, to sex with a
minor that is abusive and not merely harmful, sex that is
wrongfully exploitative (morally impermissible) and not merely
“bad” (morally unworthy). 149 This is not to discount the gravity
of the potential harms of premature sexual activity on vulnerable
and immature minors, 150 but rather to say that if the law seeks to
target harmful outcomes even in the absence of exploitation,
sexual abuse offenses are not the appropriate tool. 151 The
difficulty with seeking to so confine statutory rape laws as
applied to minors is in defining exploitation, which as Professor
Levine notes is “a complicated and somewhat abstract
phenomenon, vulnerable to the ‘I know it when I see it’ type of
definition.” 152 Given these considerations, how should a clear
legal line be drawn between “just sex,” albeit oftentimes
harmful, and sexual exploitation when it comes to juvenile
sexual encounters?

1. Tripartite Definition of Exploitation: Inequality,
Coercion and Nonconsent
To answer this question, it is useful to turn to clinical
research on juvenile sexual deviancy. Clinical experts on
problematic juvenile sexual behavior point to a definition of
sexual exploitation that draws on three elements: nonconsent,
inequality, and coercion. 153 Forcible rape and other non-strict
liability sexual assault offenses tend to focus on nonconsent,
“[t]he strongest and clearest characteristic of sexual abuse.”154
However, it is often difficult to determine the existence of
meaningful, informed consent, especially when sex involves
149. Id. at 220 (arguing that harmful sexual outcomes are “not a reason to regard the
consent as invalid between the parties”).
150. Id. at 121 (arguing that consent “may change an act from lead to silver but not
necessarily to gold”).
151. Flynn, supra note 40, at 696-97 and accompanying text. Gender-neutral,
outcome-specific laws (e.g. targeting all fornication, or sex that results in pregnancy or
sexual infection) would be a more principled method. See In re Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d 731,
734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding state failed to demonstrate that the prevention of early
pregnancy can be better served by a gender-based law than by imposing a deterrent
sanction upon both participants); Levine, supra note 80, at 713.
152. Levine, supra note 80, at 713.
153. Ryan, supra note 80, at 4 (“In any sexual interaction, the factors [that define the
nature of the interaction and relationship, and define] the presence or absence of abuse or
exploitation are consent, equality, and coercion.”); RICH, supra note 74, at 22.
154. RICH, supra note 74, at 23.
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compliant children or easily influenced younger adolescents. 155
In the absence of clear evidence of nonconsent, it is necessary to
consider inequality and coercion as indicators of abusive sexual
encounters. 156
Inequality and coercion are closely related, in that the
former refers to differentials—of development, assertiveness,
power, and authority—that are “often the tools of coercion: [for
example] perceptions of power or authority [may be] exploited
to coerce cooperation, while size differentials may coerce
compliance.” 157 The challenge with crafting statutory rape laws
that adequately and narrowly target abusive sexual encounters
involving inequality and/or coercion among juveniles is in
defining indicia of those elements clearly. As Dr. Phil Rich
notes:
[I]n any relationship between an older and younger
sibling or person, or a smarter and less smart, a bigger
and smaller, or more powerful and less powerful
person, inequality is present in the very fabric of the
relationship; thus inequality itself cannot serve as the
factor that is the agent of coercion or induces consent.
It is the quality of the difference—how the juvenile
uses it to gain advantage and the juvenile’s knowledge
of the inequality—that makes it an element of abusive
behavior, and not the inequality itself. Similarly, it is
the type, intensity, and purpose of coercion that
identifies its role as an avenue of abuse . . . [E]ven
though we can point to sexual behavior as abusive in
the absence of true consent and in the presence of
inequality and coercion, it is also clear that it is the
particular combination of circumstances and one or
more of these elements that come together to produce
abuse. 158

One response to these challenges would be to simply
specify that statutory rape laws may only be used against a
155. Id.
156. Id. at 25 (“Clear and unmistakable lack of consent eclipses the need to assess
for the presence of inequality or coercion as factors that define a sexual behavior as
abusive.”).
157. Ryan, supra note 80, at 5; see also RICH, supra note 74, at 25 (noting that
“[c]oercion is closely related to inequality, and implies power or control of some
kind . . .”).
158. RICH, supra note 74, at 25-26.
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minor in cases involving evidence of exploitation as determined
by clinical psychologists or other adolescent professionals with
expertise in assessing and evaluating sexual behavior. This
would arguably go some way to addressing the potential for
error and bias in the identification of the “true offender” and
“true victim” by prosecutors in cases where each minor is
legally a violator, and allow a nuanced, case-by-case approach
to sex within the protected class. 159 However, in the absence of
a legal definition of exploitation, this is still a highly subjective
and therefore manipulable approach that does not give adequate
notice as to when minor-minor sex is prohibited and when it is
permissible.

2. Age-Disparity Approach to Sex Among Adolescents
A clearer approach to defining the punitive target of strict
liability rape laws as applied to the protected class is to use age
differential as a non-rebuttable presumption for exploitation.160
This can take one of two forms. The more common approach is
to eliminate liability for statutory rape in cases of sexual contact
between minors within a specified age-span. 161 An alternative
age-based approach is to specify a single age of consent and a

159. Ryan, supra note 80, at 3 (“Definition of the acts that constitute sexual abuse
cannot be approached in terms of behavior alone. Relationships, dynamics, and impact
must be considered as well.”).
160. Age-gap-based statutory rape provisions are generally supplemented with
provisions that criminalize sex within certain status relationships—such as parent/child,
teacher/student, coach/player—that are considered to involve an inherently coercive power
differential. For the sake of simplicity, this article focuses on the former. For a discussion
of statutory rape provisions that focus on positions of authority used to coerce a minor, see
Kitrosser, supra note 18, at 334 arguing that “[p]er se criminalization for [certain] status
relationships . . . is appropriate, given that . . . such relationships are of the type that
inherently create a context of constructive force from which courts cannot, given a
progressive understanding of consent and coercion, extract a vision of meaningful,
uncoerced consent.”
161. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.079(1) (West 2016) (stating that
rape of a child in the third degree is sexual intercourse with someone less than sixteen
years of age is illegal, with the following exceptions: if the victim is at least fourteen years
of age and the defendant is less than four years older than the victim); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.073(1) (West 2016) (stating that if the victim is at least twelve years of age
and the defendant is less than three years older than the victim, the crime is rape of a child
in the first degree); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.076(1) (West 2016) (stating that if
the victim is less than twelve years of age and the defendant is less than two years older
than the victim, the crime is rape of a child in the second degree).
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corresponding minimum age of defendant, such that minors
below that minimum age cannot be liable for statutory rape. 162
The age-span approach involves dividing the class
protected by age-of-consent rules into age brackets or tiers,
whereas the minimum age of defendant approach establishes a
single protected class. 163 Both approaches narrow the focus of
strict liability rape laws to sexual contact involving an age-gap
as a proxy for exploitation—only sex across age-brackets, or
adult-minor sex, is presumptively abusive. 164 Where sexual
contact occurs within a protected class (that is, within the
specified age-gap, in the case of age-span jurisdictions, or
among any two minors, in the case of single age-of-consent
jurisdictions), strict liability does not apply and exploitation
must be targeted with the use of nonconsensual sexual assault
crimes such as forcible rape. 165 In other words, statutory rape’s
function is confined to that of a shield, not sword, with respect
to members of the same protected class. This restores the
internal moral logic of rape law generally, by precluding onesided statutory rape prosecutions in which the true offender
raises the equal protection argument that he is also a victim. 166
It also clarifies for juveniles, parents, and mandatory reporters
alike that the law is concerned with abuse, as evidenced by an
age disparity, and not mere fornication.
The age-based “shield not sword” approach also eliminates
the incongruity, noted by the Z.C. court, of laws that deem
minors to be too young to consent to sex, but also treat them as
“able to form the intent to commit what would be a felony if
162. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3253a(a) (West 2016); In re G.T., 758 A.2d
301, 309 (Vt. 2000) (holding a defendant must be above the age of consent to be liable for
statutory rape).
163. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.364(6) (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.230(1) (West 2015); In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 309.
164. See Master’s House, supra note 27, at 813.
165. In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 309.
166. For an example of such an argument being successfully made in relation to sex
that appeared to involve a victim-offender binary, see In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 533
(Ohio 2011) charging D.B. originally with both forcible rape and statutory rape, however
the trial court could not find evidence of force during the sexual contact; In re D.R., No. 12
MA 16, 2012 WL 5842773 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (involving an 11-year-old juvenile who
allegedly engaged in sexual conduct with a four-year-old juvenile and finding neither can
be charged with statutory rape following In re D.B.); cf. In re B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158,
167 (Minn. 2014) (Page, J., concurring) (noting that argument that defendant’s partner
X.X. was also guilty of statutory rape “harkens back to a day when sexual assault victims
were considered as culpable as the perpetrators of such assaults”).
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committed by an adult.” 167 By confining the scope of statutory
rape laws to cases involving a predetermined age differential,
the law effectively deems minors capable of consenting to sex
with similar-aged or younger minors, but not adults or their
elders, and the incongruity drops away. 168
Age-disparity is a clear, practical and well-accepted means
of defining exploitative sexual contact, focusing on a bright-line
differential that relates to the inequality and coercion aspects of
exploitation.169 Age-based definitions of exploitation preclude
discriminatory creation of an artificial or arbitrary victimoffender binary by selective enforcement against one of two
legal violators, by deeming the elder the offender. 170 This gives
greater protection to minors from unjust statutory rape
proceedings based on gender, sexual experience, sexual
orientation, and other factors.
However, the age-based approach does not preclude the
possibility that cases involving mere fornication—sex that was
not in fact exploitative—may be deemed criminal. For example,
if two thirteen-year-olds embark on a consensual sexual
relationship in a jurisdiction that sets a single age of
consent/minimum age of defendant of fourteen, their sexual
contact is beyond the scope of statutory rape until the point
when one of the minors turns fourteen, at which point the sex is
deemed nonconsensual and thus exploitative. 171 The age-gap
167. State ex rel. Z.C. v. State, 128 P.3d 561, 566 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 2005); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1(2) (West 2016) (requiring intent to cause substantial emotional or
bodily pain to any person or intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person); see
also State v. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d 1366, 1369 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the
prosecution of a minor for statutory rape but noting the “potential incongruity of punishing
one under 16 who is supposed to be protected from the sexual advances of others because
of his or her age and inability to fully consent to sex . . .”); Meiners-Levy, supra note 46, at
510 n.51 (“It is hard to imagine that when a legislature designs a criminal statute, providing
that no child under a given age is capable of consent to sexual activity in any context, the
legislators also envision that a child under that age would be subject to prosecution for
sexual contact.”); State v. Edward C., 531 A.2d 672, 673 (Me. 1987) (upholding
prosecution of minor for statutory rape, but conceding that there was merit in defendant’s
argument that purpose of the statute was to “criminalize the exploitation of children, not to
penalize the children themselves”); cf. In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(finding that once the minor defendant “assumed the status of an accused . . . he
relinquished his right to protection [under the statute]”).
168. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1369.
169. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
170. In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d at 533.
171. See, e.g., In re J.L., 800 N.W.2d 720, 724 & n.4 (S.D. 2011) (finding that the
application of the statutory rape statute [age of consent: thirteen] to juvenile, who engaged
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approach is a preferable and more nuanced approach, in that it
accounts for the possibility of meaningful consent between, say,
an older adolescent and a younger adult; however it may still
capture “just sex.” For example, it is conceivable that a mature
and responsible thirteen-year-old might be able to give
meaningful consent to sex with a sixteen-year-old, but in some
age-span schemes this would constitute statutory rape. 172 A
larger age-gap may better reflect the reality of adolescent sexual
competence.

3. Objection: Age-Based Definition of Exploitation
Under-Protects Minors from Coercive Peers
Age differentials are not perfect proxies for exploitation. It
is possible for relationships involving a significant age gap to be
non-exploitative; it is also possible for elements of inequality,
coercion and nonconsent to be present in a same-age context.
One criticism of an age-based approach to sex among minors is
that it may under-protect adolescents, particularly girls, from
non-forcible coercion by their peers, by confining the scope of
statutory rape laws exclusively to sex involving a significant
age-disparity or evidence of force. 173
For example, in the case of G.T. v Vermont, G.T. was
adjudicated delinquent for statutory rape. 174 The Supreme Court
of Vermont overturned the adjudication, construing Vermont’s
in consensual sexual intercourse with his twelve-year-old girlfriend when juvenile was
fourteen-years-old, did not yield an absurd result, but calling to the attention of the
Legislature the “other significant consequences” resulting from the statute, such that J.L.
would be required to register as a sex offender for life). But see Phipps, supra note 117, at
121-22 (arguing that “once the premise of children’s capacity to consent is accepted and
legislatures define the applicable ages, the ‘borderline’ cases [involving a defendant
“barely” above the age of consent and a close-in-age consenting minor victim] must be
accepted as within the appropriate range of behavior governed. Legal distinctions based on
age that have significant consequences are commonplace and are enforced daily”).
172. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(1) (2016) (stating that second degree rape
is engaging in sexual intercourse with someone of the opposite sex more than twelve years
of age and less than sixteen years of age where the defendant is at least sixteen years of age
and at least two years older than the victim); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY
ANSWERS:
SEX
OFFENDER
LAWS
IN
THE
U.S.
65-77
(2007),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-laws-us
[https://perma.cc/48WU-9MSN] (discussing cases of conventionally consensual adolescent
sexual relationships that gave rise to statutory rape convictions and lifelong sexual offender
registration).
173. See, e.g., COCCA, supra note 3, at 57-59; Oberman, supra note 73, at 73.
174. In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 302 (Vt. 2000).
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statutory rape statute as inapplicable where the alleged
perpetrator is also a victim under the age of consent. 175
According to the facts as found by the trial court, G.T., a
fourteen-year-old, was watching a movie with his twelve-yearold female neighbor, when he “[s]urprised [her] by suddenly
engaging in sexual intercourse with her even though the two had
had no previous sexual contact.” 176 The girl did not resist, but
when G.T. asked if it hurt and she said yes, he did not stop his
conduct. 177 Given these facts, Justice Johnson in dissent argued
that delinquency proceedings against G.T. were not
inappropriate. 178 He further argued that the majority’s ruling
abrogated statutory rape as a stopgap for cases where “[f]orcible
rape will be difficult to prove, notwithstanding the presence of
subtle coercion resulting from the age differential of the
participants or other factors.” 179
This argument assumes that prosecutors will only use
statutory rape to target cases involving coercive or
nonconsensual sex, and not, for example, other perceived harms
such as consensual incest, queer sex, loss of chastity, or
pregnancy; a questionable assumption. 180 Moreover, even
assuming that statutory rape proceedings against minors are used

175. Id.at 309.
176. Id. at 317.
177. Id. at 302.
178. Id. at 309.
179. In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 316; see also In re John C., 569 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1990) (finding that to hold that statutory rape statute should not apply to minors
themselves protected by the statute would “give minors license to sexually molest other
minors”); COCCA, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing that age spans “leave a swath of vulnerable
teens unprotected, open to coercion that is not recognized as meeting the legal definitions
of forcible rape”); Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the
Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 337-38 (2003) (noting that statutory
rape may serve as “‘the fallback position’ . . . . In these cases, defendant is only convicted
of statutory rape because of the difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
sexual intercourse was accompanied by force or threat of force, or other statutory
determination of non-consent”); Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 12, at 710 (arguing
that statutory rape laws are “a necessary complement to conventional rape law, which
offers little protection to the teenager who, due to fear, confusion, coercion, or
inexperience, has ‘consented’ to unwanted sex”); Master’s House, supra note 27, at 815-23
(discussing the use of statutory rape laws “as a back up to the laws penalizing forcible
rape”); Olsen, supra note 137, at 407 & n.94 (arguing that “statutory rape laws may
prohibit certain instances of sexual assault that should be considered illegal, but cannot be
prosecuted as forcible rape”); Levine, supra note 80, at 719 (“Quasi-forcible rapes have
long been the mainstay of statutory rape prosecutions.”).
180. See supra note 121-123 and accompanying text.
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restrictively to target non-forcible but morally impermissible
“subtle coercion” among minors, this raises the question of how
prosecutors should define coercion and what “other factors”
should be relevant to the inquiry. 181
Professor Oberman has written extensively on the dangers
of sexual coercion among minors, coercion that can be exerted
even between minors who are similar in age:
[T]his coercion may be so commonplace, and so deeply
scripted into contemporary norms of sexual interaction,
that it is all but invisible. As such, the exclusive focus
on cases involving wide age disparities may serve as a
grossly underinclusive proxy for estimating the risk of
exploitation and coercion in sexual encounters. In
short, to the extent that statutory rape law is enforced
predominantly or exclusively in cases involving wide
age disparities, an important category of victims is left
unprotected. 182

Oberman and other commentators point out that inequality
and potential coercion are not solely a function of age, but can
also be contingent on other factors, such as sexual experience
and gendered social norms. 183 Consider gender. In its first
iterations, statutory rape was primarily concerned with
protecting the premarital chastity of girls. 184 Accordingly, until
reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, statutory rape laws were
gendered and required that the female victim be of previously
chaste character. 185 Feminist-led modern reforms led to genderneutralization of statutory rape statutes in all states by 2000, 186
but to what extent do male-aggressor/female-victim stereotypes
continue to influence statutory rape enforcement? And how can
the law guard against such stereotypes—to the extent that they
may fail to adequately accommodate female sexual autonomy
and protect boys from unfounded accusations and predatory
females—while also acknowledging the possibility that the
socialization of boys to pursue and girls to acquiesce can in

181. In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 316 (Vt. 2000).
182. Master’s House, supra note 27, at 813.
183. Id. at 817-18; Turning Girls Into Women, supra note 73, at 68-70.
184. COCCA, supra note 3, at 11; Master’s House, supra note 27, at 802; Michael M.
v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 462, 494-95 (1981).
185. COCCA, supra note 3, at 11, 15.
186. Id. at 22.
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some cases result in gender-based power dynamics that are
relevant to questions of consent and coercion among peers? 187
The discretionary use of statutory rape laws in select cases
of minor-minor sex is arguably a suitably nuanced means of
protecting minors from coercive peers where it would be
difficult to prove forcible rape. 188
It is important to
acknowledge that many cases in which courts have reviewed
one-sided statutory rape proceedings against minors did indeed
involve troubling fact patterns showing evidence of pressure,
bribery or coercion, and concurrent charges of forcible rape, but
that could not be proven at trial. 189 However, as discussed
above, the discretionary enforcement of statutory rape laws
against “true offenders,” where both minors are legally violators,
is rife with potential for discrimination and inconsistency based
187. See, e.g., In Re John L., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1137, 1139 (1989) (involving girls
who agreed to sex with an older boy because they “wanted [him] to be [their] friend”); see
also Turning Girls Into Women, supra note 73, at 58; Master’s House, supra note 27, at
813; Kitrosser, supra note 18, at 288-89 (arguing that “to the degree that a ‘formal
equality’ approach [to statutory rape] ignores [the] social context [that deems male
aggressiveness and female passivity the norm in sexual relations], it risks perpetuating
inequality by refusing to see it”); Goodwin, supra note 46, at 515-16; CAHILL, supra note
123, at 171 (noting the relevance of “political and social structures that seriously limit
women’s agency and autonomy” to the question of the conceptualization of consent);
Sharon Thompson, Search for Tomorrow: On Feminism and the Reconstruction of Teen
Romance, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 350, 362 (Carole
S. Vance ed., 1984) (“[T]he early stages of romance are still differentiated by gender. He:
Will she let me? She: Does he care for me?”); Ken Tennen, Wake Up, Maggie: GenderNeutral Statutory Rape Laws, Third-Party Infant-Blood Extraction, and the Conclusive
Presumption of Legitimacy, 18 J. JUV. L. 1, 4 n.17 (1997) (discussing feminist objections to
the gender-neutralization of statutory rape laws in the 1990s which “eliminate the right of a
young, minor woman to be protected as the presumed victim”); Olsen, supra note 137, at
412 (“[A]ny acknowledgement of the actual difference between . . . males and females
stigmatizes females and perpetuates discrimination. But if we ignore power differences
and pretend that women and men are similarly situated, we perpetuate discrimination by
disempowering ourselves from instituting effective change.”). While the incidence of
female adolescents who sexually abuse remains unknown, it is not zero. Sandy Lane et al.,
Special Populations: Children, Females, the Developmentally Disabled, and Violent Youth,
in JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CORRECTION 322, 34647 (Gail Ryan & Sandy Lane eds., 2d ed. 1997); ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra note 13, at 103;
GIBSON & VANDIVER, supra note 74, at 114-29 (discussing female juvenile sex offenders);
In re Anderson, 688 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
188. Olsen, supra note 137, at 411-12 (arguing that age-gap exceptions “would not
address the problem of male sexual aggression that characterizes society at large”); Ryan,
supra note 80, at 4 (arguing that “as age differences narrow and the behaviors become less
intrusive and[/or] less aggressive, the interaction and relationship between the two
juveniles needs evaluation [to identify exploitation]”).
189. See, e.g., In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ohio 2011); In re B.A.H., 845
N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn. 2014); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 306 (Vt. 2000).
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on prosecutorial beliefs about the normative boundary between
bad and wrongful sex, with no right of reply, 190 thereby
potentially under-protecting many members of the class that
statutory rape laws are supposed to protect. Moreover, as
Professor Oberman points out, prosecuting cases that are
properly characterized as involving forced sex as mere statutory
rape arguably “undermines the seriousness of the offense of
forced sex, and thus erodes the legitimacy of laws against
rape.” 191 Accordingly, rather than using statutory rape as a stopgap for forcible rape, it is preferable to restrict the use of such
laws against members of the class they protect, and instead
consider how rape law generally can be strengthened and
supplemented.

B. Strengthening and Supplementing Rape Law
Premising statutory rape law on an age-based definition of
exploitation does not require uncritical acceptance of voluntary
sexual contact among juveniles as non-exploitative. 192 Rather,
in cases of possible exploitation within a protected class, the
burden should be on the state to prove exploitation that
constitutes (non-strict liability) sexual assault or rape. 193 To the
extent that the age-gap approach to statutory rape may leave
some minors unprotected from coercive sexual encounters with

190. In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 306 (noting that by charging as statutory rape, the
prosecutor “does not have to prove the presence of the exact elements it found to justify the
prosecution”).
191. Master’s House, supra note 27, at 822.
192. Cf. In Re John C., 569 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (upholding
delinquency adjudication of minor defendant for statutory rape and stating that “we will not
interpret the law to give minors license to sexually molest other minors”); J.A.S. v. State,
705 So. 2d 1381, 1386 (Fla. 1998) (recognizing the State’s compelling interest in
protecting minors from older minors); In re T.C., 214 P.3d 1082, 1097 (Haw. Ct. App.
2009) (noting that “the protection of all young children from sexual assault, regardless of
the age of the offender, is not inconsistent with sound public policy”); P.G. v. State, 616
S.W.2d 635, 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (“Children are entitled to no less protection from
other children who sexually abuse them than they are from adults who sexually abuse
them.”); In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127, 137 (Cal. 1970).
193. In re G.T., 758 A.2d at 309 (“We also doubt that we impose upon prosecutors
by forcing them to prove the crime they believe occurred, rather than allowing them to rely
on the relaxed burden of proof under [statutory rape].”); see also Meiners-Levy, supra note
46, at 510; Phipps, supra note 39, at 408 (noting that “statutes that objectively identify
unacceptable behavior [such as age-gap statutory rape laws] in no way exclude the
possibility of prosecuting cases of ‘problematic sexual encounters’ [involving coercion]”).
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their peers, 194 this indicates that rape law generally may be
deficient, and should be strengthened and supplemented.
Indeed, as Oliveri notes, “continually falling back on statutory
rape to compensate for deficiencies in other areas of criminal
enforcement makes it less likely that these deficiencies will be
examined and addressed.” 195
Many sexual encounters among minors involve an
incontrovertible victim-offender binary—most obviously,
molestation of a pre-pubertal child by a post-pubertal
teenager. 196 It should first be noted that such sexual contact
would be clearly proscribed by statutory rape law under an agespan approach unless the minors were close in age. In that case,
or in a single age of consent/minimum age of defendant
jurisdiction such as Vermont, such an encounter should
constitute (non-strict liability) rape due to the obvious incapacity
of pre-pubertal children to understand, much less consent to,
sex. 197 In jurisdictions where proof of force or resistance is still
required, it would be possible to strengthen rape law’s response
to pre/post-pubertal minor sex by legislating a non-rebuttable
presumption of unlawful moral or psychological force in cases
involving sexual encounters between a pre-pubertal and a postpubertal minor. 198
To the extent that rape law may still fall short of the goal of
adequately protecting juveniles from coercive sex, especially
coercion among those close in age, a great deal of relevant work
has been done on how to strengthen rape law generally, such
194. COCCA, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing that age spans “leave a swatch of
vulnerable teens unprotected, open to coercion that is not recognized as meeting the legal
definitions of forcible rape”).
195. Oliveri, supra note 14, at 502-03.
196. Ryan, supra note 80, at 4 (“It is clear that an older adolescent’s sodomizing a
small child is sexual abuse . . . .”); Phipps, supra note 39, at 430 (“[S]exual activity by a
pre-pubertal child is . . . inherently harmful regardless of the child’s expression of
willingness.”); Drobac, supra note 45, at 48 (discussing neurological development and the
connection between puberty and the ability to formulate consent).
197. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c) (West 2016).
198. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (finding that
“forcible compulsion” includes “moral, psychological or intellectual force” and that the
respective ages of the victim and defendant is relevant to determining whether requisite
force was used); State v. Eskridge, 526 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ohio 1988) (finding “subtle and
psychological” force can satisfy the force requirement). It should be noted that “age is
not . . . a reliable indicator of puberty, as physical and emotional development can occur
over extended periods when pubertal processes are under way.” ZILNEY & ZILNEY, supra
note 13, at 63.
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that the law properly identifies and sanctions nonconsensual sex
even in the absence of physical violence. 199 Professor Kitrosser
points out that while there may be political resistance to
expanding the definition of nonconsensual sex to include
coercive but non-forcible intercourse generally, legislators may
be more receptive to such reforms in the case of sex involving
minors where “sympathy for [their] unique vulnerability . . .
should provide an easier ‘sell’ for the argument that
nonconsensual sex is in itself a sufficient violation to justify
criminalization.” 200 Professor Schulhofer has proposed a model
of affirmative consent that requires “positive willingness, clearly
communicated” by words or conduct. 201
A number of
jurisdictions have adopted an affirmative consent model, 202 and
in recent years many schools and colleges have rolled out “yes
means yes” policies, combined with educational initiatives
aimed at establishing an affirmative consent culture. 203 Phipps
notes that the affirmative consent model may be particularly
useful in the context of adolescent sex, as it provides a clear rule
that is easily understood by children and teenagers. 204
199. See Phipps, supra note 39, at 438-440; STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED
SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 15 (1998) (arguing that
“[e]xisting criminal law resolves the dilemmas of sexual autonomy by making almost no
effort to control abuses that are not physically violent”); GIBSON & VANDIVER, supra note
74, at 42-43 (reporting that “it has been well documented among juvenile sex offenders that
force is rarely used; manipulation and verbal coercion are more likely”); Fischel, supra
note 25, at 320 (discussing the need for “a more robust standard of consent” for adultminor and minor sexual relations); Kitrosser, supra note 18, at 328-29 (discussing the need
to criminalize nonconsensual sex “regardless of the presence or absence of force”
particularly with regard to proving rape of a minor).
200. Kitrosser, supra note 18, at 329.
201. SCHULHOFER, supra note 199, at 271; see also Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A
Feminist Analysis, in SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 428, 438-41 (Lori Gruen & George
E. Panichas eds., 1997) (proposing a presumption of nonconsent in the absence of
communicative sex).
202. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3001(4) (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.341(4)(a) (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2016); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2016); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276 (N.J. 1992).
203. See Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The
Rational Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321,
1348 (2005).
204. Phipps, supra note 39, at 439; see also Fischel, supra note 25, at 308, 320-23
(discussing “affirmative consent as a hedge against the social structural vulnerabilities and
forms of dependence particular to young people” and arguing that the affirmative consent
standard should be incorporated vis-à-vis sex among minors and sex between minors and
adults); Kitrosser, supra note 18, at 309, 329 (discussing affirmative consent as “a crucial
step in the general law of rape, helping to dismantle the notion of ‘normal’ sex as that in
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Admittedly, even an affirmative consent model will not
catch every instance where acquiescence to sex is obtained by
lies, manipulation, persuasion or subtle coercion, factors to
which adolescents may be particularly vulnerable. 205 Indeed, as
discussed above, there is good reason to suppose that a great
deal of adolescent sexuality occurs in the context of certain
social structures, including gender-based norms, which may lead
minors to make harmful sexual decisions. In B.A.H., for
example, X.X. testified that he wasn’t forced to have sex with
his cousin, but that “he [B.A.H.] convinced me because he’s my
favorite cousin . . . .” 206 Is this impermissible coercion or
permissible persuasion? It is possible, perhaps likely, that this
was at least a “bad bargain” that caused emotional harm to
X.X. 207 But given that the law also considers B.A.H. a
vulnerable minor, himself liable to making harmful sexual
decisions, I contend that in such borderline cases, non-punitive
preventative sex education policies and rehabilitation measures
are the fairest way to challenge unhealthy social norms about
sexuality and to discourage “bad sex” among minor-peers, while
recognizing the important distinction between naïve
experimentation and sexual aggression and predation. 208 It
would also be possible to craft supplementary juvenile-specific
which a man is free to presume access to a woman’s vagina unless she puts up a
particularly loud fight or unless he employs unusually forceful means to gain access” and
that such a standard “could play a particularly important role in catching many instances of
coercion to which adolescent girls . . . may tend to be particularly susceptible”).
205. Oberman, supra note 114, at 370 (arguing that “[s]ociety’s inability to embrace
a strong criminal law norm in response to coercive sexual encounters between
acquaintances renders teens’ sexual exploitation more a rite of passage than a crime”);
Kitrosser, supra note 18, at 330 (discussing limits of the law in directly combating deeply
internalized sexism that causes girls to make bad sexual bargains with boys); Master’s
House, supra note 27, at 822 (arguing that “to the extent that we deprive prosecutors of the
option of using statutory rape, we hold underage victims of acquaintance rape to the
standards of adult victims, standards that assume a sense of maturity and self-possession
that many adolescent girls lack”).
206. In re B.A.H., 829 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
207. Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 12, at 713-17 (on the problem of bad
sexual bargains among teenagers); see also Thompson, supra note 187, at 352.
208. For an example of rehabilitative and educational measures in the context of sex
among adolescents, see Nowack, supra note 80, at 894-95, discussing Dane County,
Wisconsin’s Responsible Sexuality Course. See also Goodwin, supra note 46, at 536-37
(discussing market incentives as a means of promoting healthy sexual behavior among
teenagers, without resorting to criminal prosecutions for consensual sex); Stine, supra note
46, at 1223-26 (discussing mandatory sex education programs as an alternative to
punishing teenagers for consensual sex).
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(non-criminal) status offenses that target sexual encounters
among juveniles that fall short of forcible or statutory rape, but
are morally problematic or likely to be harmful to the minors
involved. This could take the form of permitting delinquency
adjudication for “anti-social juvenile sexual behavior,” bringing
youths within the reach of rehabilitative juvenile institutions for
clearly-defined problematic sexual behavior such as
impregnating multiple partners, participating in group sex,209
bribery or sex while voluntarily intoxicated. Such an offense
should be focused on rehabilitation, re-education, and victim
support, 210 with awareness that deviant or abnormal sexual
behavior among minors may itself be an indicator of prior sexual
trauma. 211 It would also be imperative that care is taken to
ensure such measures are not enforced arbitrarily against
“unpopular youths,” but rather based on clear evidence of
deviancy and moral culpability; incorporating an intent
requirement would be one way to address such concerns. In this
way, the law can intervene and respond to cases that evince
worrying coercive, predatory, or manipulative tendencies while
maintaining a distinction between harmful sex and wrongful sex,
sex per se and sexual abuse. 212

V. CONCLUSION
Adolescents are sexual creatures. Sexual development is
an important aspect of the transition from childhood to
209. See GIBSON & VANDIVER, supra note 74, at 45-46; Garfinkle, supra note 74, at
193 (noting evidence of the relative prevalence of group involvement in reported rapes by
child and adolescent offenders); Regulating Consensual Sex, supra note 12, at 718.
210. See generally Philip A. Ikomi, Once a Sex Offender, Always a Sex Offender?, in
JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS: WHAT THE PUBLIC NEEDS TO KNOW (2008) (discussing the
recidivism and treatment of juvenile sexual deviancy).
211. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
212. State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1213 (Utah 2007) (quoting state legislator, “I
think most of us would agree that when twelve and thirteen years olds get involved in this
kind of behavior it’s certainly not something we want to allow or encourage. We also
probably do not want to convict them both of ‘rape of a child . . . .’”); Phipps, supra note
39, at 434 (“Labeling voluntary activity between two teenagers as ‘rape’ or ‘child sexual
abuse’ would strike most people as incongruent.”).
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adulthood, and a transition that is unique to each adolescent. As
society adjusts to the notion of adolescent sexual autonomy and
privacy interests, there is an inevitable tension between
recognizing those interests while safeguarding a relatively
vulnerable and immature population from sexual power
imbalances and pressures.
The balance struck in many jurisdictions is to set an age of
consent that theoretically prohibits all sex among minors, but in
practice is only enforced in cases involving “bad sex” as defined
by prosecutors.
This can result in proceedings against
conventionally consenting minors for rape of each other, an
absurd outcome that risks conflating mere fornication with
abuse; or one-sided prosecutions of the “true offenders,”
prosecutions that may be unjust and that have serious lifelong
consequences. This approach introduces too much subjectivity
and ambiguity into an area of law that needs to send clear and
consistent messages to adolescents about the boundaries of
good, bad and wrongful sex, and can too easily result in
inconsistent and unprincipled legal regulation of adolescent sex.
To ensure that strict liability rape laws shield all adolescents,
from unprincipled and discriminatory statutory rape proceedings
as much as from other predatory minors, the law must be
premised on objective and clear criteria of exploitation and
meaningful notions of consent.

